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H. C. ROBINSON* 
This Article puts its analytic lens directly on the relationship between technology and legal 
change in an attempt to understand the increasingly prominent role of SuperPACs in American 
politics. It focuses on the relationship between law, technology, and social change, showing how 
the Supreme Court’s view of the relationship between television and the provision of information 
to voters in a mass society shaped its decision to extend the First Amendment’s protection of 
freedom of political expression to organizations in Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission. The Article makes two key findings: first, that technological development may drive 
even the most “originalist” law court to underwrite its legal reasoning with normative ideas 
about technology; and, second, that when technology management questions surface within the 
bounds of a constitutional case, countermajoritarian judicial answers can easily prevail over 
those already given by legislative bodies. The Article argues that, under these conditions, 
personhood has “shifted” between organizations and individuals within the constitutional order 
of freedom of expression, allowing SuperPACs to rise as prominent players on the American 
political scene. 
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The single most significant phenomenon in modern American history is the 
emergence of giant, complex organizations. In the present day it is apparent that 
bureaucracies of one sort or another dominate our economic system, control the 
central features of our polity, and shape many of the important aspects of our 
culture.
1
 
INTRODUCTION 
In one of the most widely cited texts on the rise of the corporation in the United States, 
historian Alan Trachtenberg notes that the concept of “technology” came into usage during the 
decades following the Civil War, in parallel to the rise in the modern corporate form of 
ownership.
2
 This Article investigates the role of that concept—technology—in decisionmaking by 
the United States Supreme Court that concerns the constitutional rights of corporations during the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It uses this investigation to more fully explain the Court’s 
early twenty-first century decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,
3
 and to 
reason more broadly about the role of corporations in our society as it continues to modernize. 
As we approach the next U.S. presidential election in 2016, Citizens United passes its 
fifth anniversary. The decision remains controversial because it is widely viewed as having 
transformed American politics into a clash of “SuperPACs:” organizations that aggregate money 
from undisclosed sources and use technologies of mass media to influence the American 
electorate.
4
 After Citizens United found “no basis for the proposition that, in the political speech 
                                                                
1
 LOUIS GALAMBOS, THE PUBLIC IMAGE OF BIG BUSINESS IN AMERICA, 1880-1940: A QUANTITATIVE 
STUDY IN SOCIAL CHANGE 3 (1975). 
2  ALAN TRACHTENBERG, THE INCORPORATION OF AMERICA: CULTURE AND SOCIETY IN THE GILDED AGE 
54-55 (2007); see also RAYMOND WILLIAMS, KEYWORDS 315 (1983) (describing how the word “technology” was used 
from the seventeenth century to “describe a systematic study of the arts” or “the terminology of a particular art” but it was 
not until the nineteenth century that the familiar modern definition of technology as the practical application of scientific 
knowledge emerged), and Leo Marx, Technology: The Emergence of a Hazardous Concept, 51 TECH. & CULTURE, 561, 
562 (2010) (noting the same distinction in the modern emergence of usage of the word “technology”). 
3  Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
4  Inaugurating the era of the “Super PAC,” the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in Speechnow.org v. Fed. 
Election Comm’n relied on Citizens United to hold that organizations making independent expenditures in support or 
opposition of political candidates cannot be restricted in receiving contributions. 599 F.3d 686, 696, 698 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
These organizations qualify for tax-exempt status as social welfare groups under § 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue 
Code, as long as their political participation does not constitute their “primary activity.” Raymond Chick & Amy Henchey, 
M. Political Organizations and IRC 501(c)(4), INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (1995), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
tege/eotopicm95.pdf. For examples of the financial and media activities of SuperPACs, see Abdullah Ansari, Super PACs: 
Changing the nature of the game, CAIR-CHICAGO (Aug. 6, 2012), http://www.cairchicago.org/2012/08/06/super-pacs-
changing-the-nature-of-the-game; Peter Overby, How to Oust a Congressman, SuperPAC-Style, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Nov. 
23, 2012, 8:38 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=165761797; Jeff Zeleny & Jim 
Rutenberg, Obama Yields in Marshaling of ‘Super PAC,’ N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/07/us/politics/with-a-signal-to-donors-obama-yields-on-super-
pacs.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; Matea Gold, Koch-backed political network, built to shield donors, raised $400 million 
in 2012 elections, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/koch-backed-political-network-
built-to-shield-donors-raised-400-million-in-2012-elections/2014/01/05/9e7cfd9a-719b-11e3-9389-
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context, the [g]overnment may impose restrictions on certain disfavored speakers,” even if the 
speaker is a corporation or similar organization,
5
 campaign spending in the United States 
increased by nearly two billion dollars between the presidential elections of 2008 and 2012.
6
 In 
the latter election, SuperPACs alone spent one billion dollars.
7
 
This Article links Citizens United and the rise of the SuperPAC to what it argues is a 
jurisprudential evolution in the legal status of corporations in the United States, beyond their 
nineteenth century designation as “mere creature[s] of the law.”
8
 It identifies technology as an 
important medium that afforded corporations new capacities to exercise different kinds of 
freedom of action beyond simply executing contracts and other financial transactions, the 
purposes for which “corporate personhood” originated in law and had long served prior to the 
emergence of the SuperPAC.
9
 It then analyzes the Supreme Court’s interpretation of technology 
within key corporate rights decisions in order to better understand the outcome of rulings that 
have brought corporations and similar organizations more fully under the protection of 
constitutional law. 
The relevance of this kind of inquiry can be illustrated at the outset by considering the 
subject matter of the dispute in Citizens United. A nonprofit corporation “dedicated to restoring 
government to citizens’ control,”
10
 Citizens United sought to tell voters during the 2008 
Democratic primary that Hillary Clinton was a “Machiavellian” presidential candidate.
11
 It did not 
hire groups of canvassers, however, to disseminate that idea, or publish it in a newspaper; instead, 
it produced a documentary it wanted to make available “on-demand” to cable television 
subscribers.
12
 This action ran afoul of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, popularly 
                                                                
09ef9944065e_story.html; Peter Overby, Political Groups Aim Early Attacks at New Hampshire Senator, NAT’L PUB. 
RADIO (Jan. 14, 2014, 3:35 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=262191075.  
5  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 312.  
6  Evan Osnos, Embrace the Irony, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 13, 2014, 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/10/13/embrace-irony (describing data concerning the rise in spending after 
Citizens United, while reporting about Professor Lawrence Lessig’s SuperPAC in opposition to the decision). 
7  Id.  
8  Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 518, 636 (1819), discussed infra, Part I, pp. 
407-421. 
9  See MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 109 (1977). 
By the end of the eighteenth century, the new American states had become involved in the process of promoting economic 
development by granting corporate charters and franchises to private investors. Though this pattern has often been 
portrayed as economically inevitable, it actually seems to have arisen out of conscious considerations of policy.  
See, e.g., Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 177-78 (1868) (emphasizing that corporate rights are limited other than “where 
contracts or rights of property are to be enforced”), overruled by United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n., 322 U.S. 533 
(1944). 
10  Who We Are, CITIZENS UNITED, http://www.citizensunited.org/who-we-are.aspx (last visited Jun. 13, 
2015). 
11  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 325 (2010) (internal citation omitted). 
12  Id. at 320. 
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known as “McCain-Feingold.”
13
 McCain-Feingold aimed to curb what legislators described as an 
“ad war” driven by a “flow of negative ads” produced by outside groups in American politics—
groups that were neither political parties nor campaigns.
14
 It did so by restricting corporations and 
unions from using their general treasury funds to make independent expenditures for broadcast, 
cable, or satellite “electioneering communication” that was capable of reaching fifty thousand or 
more persons in a state in which a primary election was being held within thirty days, or a general 
election within sixty days.
15
 
McCain-Feingold combined a focus on specific kinds of organizations with a focus on 
specific technologies of mass media, and left untouched traditional political parties, low-tech 
means of communication like the newspaper, and outside group expenditures on things other than 
mass broadcast communication. This represented a distinct departure from previous regulations of 
campaign finance that were focused on restricting political contributions and expenditures, and 
which characterized the entire previous century of electoral regulation.
16
 
Understood properly as a regulation of technology, McCain-Feingold’s constitutional 
undoing in Citizens United can be more clearly associated with strong statements that the Court 
made about television in that opinion. These statements countered Congress’ view of a toxic 
electoral climate produced by the “ad wars,” with a robust technological optimism about 
organization-funded mass media in contemporary democracy. Justice Kennedy, writing for the 
majority, described television as “society’s most salient media” and one of “the most important 
means of mass communication in modern times.”
17
 He concluded that “[r]apid changes in 
technology—and the creative dynamic inherent in the concept of free expression—counsel 
against upholding a law that restricts political speech in certain media or by certain speakers,” 
whether organizations or individuals.
18
 
We can see here the articulation of a specific judicial understanding of the relationship 
between technology and freedom of expression, in which the latter accommodates the former, not 
the reverse. Science, technology, and society (STS) scholars call this a “technological 
imperative.”
19
 It views technology as bringing to political discourse certain permanent and one-
                                                                
13  Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (McCain-Feingold Act), Pub L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 
(codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441(b)(2), § 434(f)(3)(A) (2006); 11 C.F.R. § 100.29(a)(2) § 100.29(b)(3)(ii) (2014). 
14  148 Cong. Rec. S2117 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2002) (statement of Sen. Cantwell) (“This bill is about slowing 
the ad war. . . . It is about . . .  making sure the flow of negative ads by outside interest groups does not continue to 
permeate the airwaves.”).  
15  Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (McCain-Feingold Act), Pub L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 
(codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441(b)(2), § 434(f)(3)(A) (2006); 11 C.F.R. § 100.29(a)(2), § 100.29(b)(3)(ii) (2014)). 
16  Compare McCain-Feingold Act with Tillman Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864 (codified as 
amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006)), and Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 
(1972) (current version at 52 U.S.C.A. § 30101 (2002)). 
17  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 353. 
18  Id. at 364.   
19  Technological determinism, or the idea of a technological “imperative,” is common to an oversimplified 
analysis of the role of technology in society. See R.L. Heilbroner, Do Machines Make History?, in DOES TECHNOLOGY 
DRIVE HISTORY? THE DILEMMA OF TECHNOLOGICAL DETERMINISM 53, 54 (Merritt Roe Smith & Leo Marx eds., 1994) 
(quoting Karl Marx for the proposition that “[t]he hand-mill gives you society with the feudal lord; the steam-mill, society 
with the industrial capitalist”).  
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directional changes to which the constitutional order of freedom of expression must adapt. Thus: 
“Rapid changes in technology. . .counsel against upholding a law that restricts political speech.”
20
 
This Article reveals that this kind of thinking did not originate with Citizens United, however; it 
instead extended from a series of First Amendment cases that began to address questions about 
the role of television in American society, beginning in the middle of the twentieth century.
21
 
These earlier cases show a distinctive progression. First, the Court noted that television 
was exceptionally expensive as a medium for expression, but had become necessary to 
communicate across the wide swaths of “today’s mass society.”
22
 Under this rationale, it held in 
Buckley v. Valeo, in some sense the Citizens United of its time,
23
 that the expenditure of money on 
political advocacy was itself a form of expressive activity protected under the First Amendment.
24
 
During this same period, the Court determined that the listener’s “right to receive” information
25
 
within a “marketplace of ideas”
26
 was of equal constitutional importance as the traditional 
speaker’s right to self-expression. 
As conceptual tools, both the marketplace of ideas and the listener’s right to receive them 
were prerequisite to shifting the legal paradigm governing the constitutional protection of freedom 
of expression towards the inclusion of organizations. They provided room within the First 
Amendment to protect cheap listening by individuals, for whom television was a receiver, and 
expensive speech by organizations, for whom it was a transmitter. As long as the airwaves were 
unobstructed, it did not matter whether one was a “seller” or a “buyer” in this marketplace. 
Citizens United is therefore the capital on a pillar of reasoning about television that the Supreme 
Court built up within its First Amendment jurisprudence after the technology emerged around the 
middle of the twentieth century. Under this reasoning, McCain-Feingold was problematic because 
it regulated precisely those kinds of technology (broadcast, satellite, and cable communication) 
that the Court had already deemed necessary to disseminate ideas to a primarily listening 
population in contemporary mass society, and it regulated precisely those kinds of speakers 
(corporations and unions) that could afford to produce it. 
This Article argues that conclusion is driven as much by corporations’ relationship, as 
                                                                
20  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 364.   
21  See discussion infra, Part II, pp. 421-432.  
22  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (explaining that “virtually every means of communicating ideas 
in today’s mass society requires the expenditure of money . . . . The electorate’s increasing dependence on television, 
radio, and other mass media for news and information has made these expensive modes of communication indispensable 
instruments of effective political speech.”); c.f. United States v. Cong. of Indus. Orgs., 335 U.S. 106, 146 (1948) 
(Rutledge, J., concurring) (“Unions can act and speak today only by spending money, as indeed is true of nearly every 
organization and even of individuals if their action is to be effective.”).  
23  Buckley, like Citizens United, brought outside groups more fully into American politics than ever before; 
see infra, Part II.C, pp. 427-432. 
24  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 51.  
25  Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943); see also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 
(1969); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976) (“[T]he protection 
afforded is to the communication, to its source and to its recipients both.”); Constitutional Law, 60 VA. L. REV. 1490, 
1491 (1974) (describing the Va. Pharmacy decision and noting, “[t]he first amendment ‘right to know’ asserted by the 
plaintiffs is a relatively recent development.”). 
26  Red Lion Broad. Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). 
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aggregators of capital, to the changes in communication brought about by new technology as it is 
about their relationship to the Constitution. Reviewing a series of much earlier cases concerning 
railroad corporations, it shows that relationship, too, has origins far older than Citizens United. 
Precisely the same relationship between corporations and capital drove the Supreme Court to alter 
the way it determined the jurisdiction of corporations under Article III in response to new 
technologies of movement during the nineteenth century.
27
 
With its historical arc and interdisciplinary lens, the Article is able to reframe our recent 
debate over “corporate personhood” as not just about technologies of mass communication and 
“SuperPACs” in the twenty-first century, but about the role of collective activity in a society 
undergoing modernization more broadly. Thus the Article links cases across doctrinal categories 
to a larger sociological phenomenon: the rise of organizations as a dominant form of social and 
economic order in the industrial and post-industrial United States. It thereby reconciles what seem 
at first blush to be two disparate things—the “oldness” of corporate personhood and the 
“newness” of rulings like Citizens United—by reading together two strains of social theory, also 
one old and one new. First, it notices that the rise of organizations in modern societies, which 
thinkers like Max Weber began to investigate at the turn of the last century, runs in parallel to the 
rise in constitutional disputes concerning their freedom of action.
28
 Next, drawing perspectives 
from the field of science, technology, and society studies, it notices that judicial views about 
technology are instrumental to the legal reasoning in key cases, but are greatly overshadowed by 
the “rights talk” within them. What results is a conflation of reasoning about technology and 
reasoning about rights that has placed organizations squarely within the countermajoritarian 
protection of our federal courts.
29
 
This Article untangles that reasoning. Its central argument is that a complex mix of 
“technologies”—new jurisprudence, new organizational forms, and new technology—has driven 
contemporary corporations into a more full form of “shifted personhood” under the Constitution 
than these organizations possessed during the nineteenth century.
30
 It has shifted because in the 
                                                                
27 See discussion infra Part I, pp. 407-421. 
28  See, e.g., MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 337 (Talcott Parsons 
ed., A.M. Henderson trans., 1947). Early twentieth-century sociologist Max Weber noted the emergence of organizations 
across almost all sectors of human activity in the highly populous and technological societies of the twentieth century, 
describing the “development of the modern form of the organization of corporate groups in all fields” regardless of 
differences in the type of political economy. Id. He observed that organizations were taking center stage in industrial 
societies not only in business, but also in “church and state, of armies, political parties . . . organizations to promote all 
kinds of causes, private associations, clubs, and many others.” Id.  
29  Probably the most obvious explanation for the conflation of reasoning about technology with reasoning 
about rights is that it serves institutional values within law as a profession (however this does not exculpate us within 
academic legal thought for missing the role of technology in these decisions). Law and society scholars describe the 
function of the kind of legal formalism that shades the technological reasoning in the cases that follow as allowing the 
elaboration of systems of logically ordered and conceptually coherent doctrines on which lawyers can make predictions 
about the outcomes of legal arguments. Carroll Seron & Susan S. Silbey, Profession, Science, and Culture: An Emergent 
Canon of Law and Society Research, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO LAW AND SOCIETY 30-60, 33 n.2 (Austin Sarat 
ed., 2004). 
30  See, e.g., Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. at 543 (“Being the mere creature of  law, [a corporation] possesses 
only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it . . . .”); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (1 Wall) 168, 177 
(1868) (“[Corporations are] artificial persons created by the legislature, and possessing only those attributes which the 
legislature has prescribed…”), overruled by United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n. et al, 322 U.S. 533 (1944); as 
discussed infra, Part I, pp. 407-421. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol18/iss5/2
ROBINSON_SHIFTED PERSONHOOD_FORMATTED_FINALFINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/11/2016  10:03 AM 
2016] SHIFTED PERSONHOOD 409 
Court’s own language corporate rights originate from the human beings who are intrinsically 
endowed with them.
31
 Thus Justice Scalia, concurring with the majority in Citizens United, 
described a corporation as “speak[ing] on behalf of the human beings who have formed that 
association;”
32
 and, Justice Alito wrote for the majority in Hobby Lobby that protecting the 
religious free-exercise rights of corporations “protects the liberty of the humans who own and 
control those companies.”
33
 
We face important questions concerning technology and social ordering in our age. This 
Article shows how the Supreme Court has answered some of those questions in its jurisprudence 
concerning the constitutional rights of organizations. While it has reflected a well-documented 
shift in the United States towards an “organizational society,”
34
 this activity raises two critical 
issues: first, regarding the institutional capacity of courts versus legislatures to reason about the 
technologies that enable the exercise of particular freedoms of action by organizations; and 
second, regarding the reversability of social orders based on such reasoning when they are set into 
motion by countermajoritarian bodies versus popularly-accountable ones. 
I. BEFORE CITIZENS UNITED 
In law during most of the nineteenth century, preindustrial economic conditions 
underwrote a focus on protecting individual freedom of action. Preindustrialism’s distinctive 
credo was not a belief in organizations, but a “belief in the effectiveness of individual effort”
35
 
and a conviction in “the dignity of labor and the moral worth of those who worked.”
36
 The 
corporate form was but one among many legal tools for individuals to advance their aims; the 
partnership was much more widely used. During the first half of the nineteenth century, the 
Supreme Court recognized corporate rights to hold and transfer property,
37
 to make contracts,
38
 
and to sue and be sued,
39
 yet it continued to hew to a view, articulated by James Madison in a 
                                                                
31  The Framers absorbed an understanding of the Magna Carta (1215) as a declaration of natural rights from 
the theories of John Locke, who reasoned in his Second Treatise of Civil Government that individuals possessed rights in a 
“state of nature,” and carried those rights into the social compact out of which the state emerged. See PAUL BREST ET AL., 
PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 25, 147, 152 (5th ed., 2006).   
32  Citizens United at 392 n.7 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
33  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, No. 13-354, slip op. at 18 (U.S. June 30, 2014).  
3434 34  I do not know the origin of the term “organizational society,” but have traced an early significant 
use to Kenneth Thompson, The organizational society, in CONTROL AND IDEOLOGY IN ORGANIZATIONS 3 (Graeme 
Salaman & Kenneth Thompson eds., 1980). The phenomena is discussed at length in Part I.C, infra, pp. 416-421. 
35  THOMAS C. COCHRAN, BUSINESS IN AMERICAN LIFE: A HISTORY 170 (1972).  
36  DANIEL T. RODGERS, THE WORK ETHIC IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1850-1920, at 6 (2d ed. 2014). Of the 
era’s prominent “works on work,” Benjamin Franklin’s biography and “Poor Richard” aphorisms are best known for 
emphasizing individual occupation as both the principal source of happiness and the foundation of national greatness. See, 
e.g., BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, POOR RICHARD: THE ALMANACKS FOR THE YEARS 1733-1758  (Bonanza Books 1979) (1739) 
(offering practical advice from business and scientific perspectives). 
37  Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. at 526. 
38  Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (1 Pet.) 519, 526 (1839). 
39  Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 497 (1844). 
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1791 speech before Congress, that corporations received “rights and attributes” from government 
that, unlike a natural person’s, “could not otherwise be claimed.”
40
 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, however, the technological transformations of 
industrialism channeled most human activity into new modern organizational forms to meet the 
needs of large-scale producers. Corporations came to dominate the economic sector,
41
 and as the 
century wore on, similar types of organizations arose in government (with the rise of the 
administrative state),
42
 in advocacy (with the emergence of nonprofit and nongovernmental 
organizations),
43
 in work (with the formation of unions and professional associations),
44
 and in 
leisure (with the rise of mass membership organizations).
45
 Society at large thus became 
increasingly “organizational” during the twentieth century.
46
 
In parallel, the Supreme Court’s view of corporations began to shift. By the end of the 
twentieth century, it would describe James Madison’s view that corporations, “as creatures of the 
State,”
47
 had only those rights granted to them by it, as “an extreme position.”
48
 By the early 
twenty-first century, the Court would signal that organizations possessed something closer to the 
personal liberty of individual citizens. This section covers the nineteenth century portion of that 
evolution, looking in particular at the impact of the earliest corporations on the legal doctrine of 
jurisdiction. 
A. Corporate Personhood is Not New, It’s Old 
From the nature of things, the artificial person called a corporation, must be 
created, before it can be capable of taking any thing.
49
 
                                                                
40
 JAMES MADISON, Speech in Congress Opposing the National Bank (Feb. 2, 1791), in WRITINGS 480, 487 
(Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999). Compare the debate conducted during the drafting and ratification of the 1787 Constitution, 
concerning whether adding a Bill of Rights to the Constitution risked suggesting, wrongly, that government had granted 
them. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 515 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003). 
41  See generally ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN 
AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977) (arguing that management supplanted market forces as the most influential factor in the 
economy).  
42  See JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 7 (1938).  
43  See LESTER M. SALAMON, PARTNERS IN PUBLIC SERVICE: GOVERNMENT-NONPROFIT RELATIONS IN THE 
MODERN WELFARE STATE 243 (1995). 
44
 FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE GREAT DISRUPTION: HUMAN NATURE AND THE RECONSTITUTION OF SOCIAL 
ORDER 54 (1999) (counting 201,000 nonprofit organizations, unions, groups, and clubs in the U.S. in 1949, and 1.14 
million nonprofit organizations in 1989).  
45  See ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY 
59, 63 (2001). 
46  See Thompson, supra note 34. 
47  JAMES MADISON, Speech in Congress Opposing the National Bank (Feb. 2, 1791), in WRITINGS 480, 487 
(Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999).  
48  First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 n.14 (1978). 
49  Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. 518, 575 (1819) (Story, J., concurring). 
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“Corporate personhood” is not a modern concept but a centuries-old legal fiction 
designed to free economic actors from the inefficiencies of personal mortality and liability in their 
business transactions.
50
 Dartmouth College v. Woodward illustrates this principle.
51
 Established in 
1769, Dartmouth College was set up as a private educational institution to be managed by an 
incorporated board of trustees. After the Revolutionary War, the legislature of New Hampshire 
passed an act converting the college into a quasi-public institution to be overseen by appointees of 
the governor.
52
 The board of trustees sued, claiming that New Hampshire had violated its rights as 
an incorporated organization.
53
 
The case came before the U.S. Supreme Court in 1819.
54
 Chief Justice John Marshall, 
whose legal reasoning greatly dominated the Court’s formative early decades, wrote the opinion.
55
 
He began by defining a corporation: 
A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in 
contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of the law, it possesses only 
those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either 
expressly, or as incidental to its very existence.
56
 
Among the most important of these properties was “immortality, and, if the expression 
may be allowed, individuality.”
57
 Marshall explained that these properties allow “a perpetual 
succession of many persons” to be “considered as the same” and to “act as a single individual.”
58
 
This legal fiction served pragmatic ends. It allowed “a corporation to manage its own 
affairs, and to hold property without the perplexing intricacies, the hazardous and endless 
necessity, of perpetual conveyances for the purpose of transmitting it from hand to hand.”
59
 The 
need for “perpetual conveyances” was due to the mortality of human beings, which required the 
transfer of their property upon death through legal instruments. The corporate form resolved this 
difficulty by conveying a kind of “immortal” personhood on individuals associating together in a 
business form that would indefinitely survive them. Justice Marshall noted that “[i]t is chiefly for 
the purpose of clothing bodies of men, in succession, with these qualities and capacities, that 
                                                                
50  See generally Pauline Maier, The Revolutionary Origins of the American Corporation, 50 WM. & MARY 
Q. 3D 51 (1993) (discussing early history of the American corporation).  
51  Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. at 526. 
52  Id. at 526, 585-586. 
53  Id. at 518. 
54  Id. 
55  John Marshall served as Chief Justice from 1801–1835. See John Marshall Biography, BIOGRAPHY.COM, 
http://www.biography.com/people/john-marshall-9400148 (last visited Jun. 13, 2015) (noting that John Marshall was 
“largely responsible for establishing the Supreme Court’s role in federal government”).   
56  Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. at 543. Justice Story, concurring in the judgment, gives a fuller but analogous 
definition. Id. at 561 (Story, J., concurring). 
57  Id. at 543.  
58  Id.   
59  Id.  
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corporations were invented, and are in use.”
60
 
However, incorporation gave to an organization “not mere naked powers . . . but powers 
coupled with an interest.”
61
 This comported with nineteenth-century metaphysics, which was 
described as a uniquely human trait the capacity to pursue goals beyond their utilitarian value.
62
  
With no existence apart from its ends, therefore, the corporation was simply a utilitarian tool, 
“created by law, for the purpose of being employed by . . . individuals.”
63
 Dartmouth College 
backstopped this conclusion with familiar nineteenth century reasoning about the obligation of 
contracts—not with a theory about the corporation as a rights possessing entity, a theory the Court 
would reach by the end of the century.
64
 
McCulloch v. Maryland, the better-known Supreme Court case of that year, also 
concerned the nature of incorporated organizations.
65
 During the Jackson administration, 
Congress had incorporated a national bank to aid in the collection of taxes, the administration of 
public finance, and the repayment of Revolutionary War debt.
66
 The question of the bank’s 
constitutionality arose. Finding it well within the scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 
Justice Marshall emphasized its essentially utilitarian nature, writing in McCulloch that 
incorporation was only “a means by which other objects are accomplished . . . never used for its 
own sake, but for the purpose of effecting something else.”
67
 Marshall analogized, “No city was 
ever built with the sole object of being incorporated, but is incorporated as affording the best 
means of being well governed.”
68
 Regarding Congress’ lack of express power to incorporate a 
bank under the Constitution, Marshall wrote, “being considered merely as a means, to be 
employed only for the purpose of carrying into execution the given powers, there could be no 
motive for particularly mentioning it.”
69
 Thus, it was not fatal that the word “incorporation” did 
not appear in the text. 
The Supreme Court continued to emphasize that a corporation was only “a person, for 
certain purposes in contemplation of law” through the middle of the nineteenth century.
70
 In the 
                                                                
60  Id.  
61  Id. at 580 (Story, J., concurring). 
62  See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Mary Gregor trans., Cambridge University 
Press 2d ed. 1996) (1797). 
63  Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. at 544.   
64  See id. at 548 (“This is plainly a contract to which the donors, the trustees and the crown, (to whose rights 
and obligations New-Hampshire succeeds,) were the original parties.”); id. at 553 (“[The college’s founders] contracted 
for a system, which should, so far as human foresight can provide, retain forever the government of the literary institution 
they had formed, in the hands of persons approved by themselves.”); id. at 551-52 (“The opinion of the court, after mature 
deliberation, is, that this is a contract, the obligation of which cannot be impaired, without violating the constitution of the 
United States.”). 
65  McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).  
66  BREST, supra note 31, at 28, (citing BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA: FROM THE 
REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR 114-15 (1957)). 
67  McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 476. 
68  Id.  
69  Id. at 482.   
70  Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 US (13 Pet.) 519, 588 (1839). 
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1839 case of Bank of Augusta v. Earle, the Court held that a corporation could make a contract 
enforceable in a state other than the one in which it was incorporated because the purpose of a 
corporation was to carry out economic transactions.
71
 These economic freedoms, however, did not 
entitle a corporation to the broader privileges of the body politic. Almost thirty years later, in Paul 
v. Virginia, the Court excluded corporations from the privileges and immunities of Article IV.
72
 It 
emphasized that corporate rights were limited other than “where contracts or rights of property are 
to be enforced.”
73
 Therefore, the privileges and immunities of citizens did not extend to 
corporations, because the term citizen applied “only to natural persons, members of the body 
politic, owing allegiance to the State, not to artificial persons created by the legislature, and 
possessing only those attributes which the legislature has prescribed.”
74
 
As incorporated organizations began to dominate the economies of industrializing 
societies during the second half of the nineteenth century, however, this conception of 
corporations as the tools of individuals—not “entities” in their own right—would shift. 
B. When the Railroads Changed Jurisdiction 
The corporation, in short, was the most powerful and prominent example of the 
emergence of non-individualistic or, if you will, collectivist legal institutions 
[during the nineteenth century.]
75
 
In his study of how the “visible hand” of managerial capitalism overtook what Adam 
Smith famously described as the “invisible hand” of market forces, historian Alfred Chandler 
noted that during most of the nineteenth century “the volume of economic activity was not yet 
large enough to make administrative coordination more productive and, therefore, more profitable 
than market coordination.”
76
 The resulting absence of large corporations in the United States 
provided a cultural underlay for the Supreme Court’s nineteenth century description of them as 
“invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law.”
77
 
Most nineteenth century business organizations were local, familial enterprises: if they 
assumed a legal form at all, “it was that of a partnership.”
78
 Unlike a corporation, a partnership 
existed only as long as its founders lived and, when not self-financed, relied on a local credit 
                                                                
71  Id. at 588-89 
72  Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (1 Wall.) 168, 177 (1868), overruled by United States v. Se. Underwriters 
Ass’n. et al, 322 U.S. 533, 543 (1944). The case concerned a Virginia law requiring agents of insurance companies not 
incorporated in the state to obtain a license and deposit a large money bond to transact business there. Id. at 168. An agent 
of several insurers argued that the law violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause by treating his corporate employer 
differently simply because it was incorporated in New York. Id. at 169-70. 
73  Id. 
74  Paul, 75 U.S. at 177. 
75  MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL 
ORTHODOXY, at 72 (1992). 
76  CHANDLER, supra note 41, at 485. 
77  Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. at 543. 
78  CHANDLER, supra note 41, at 8, 50.   
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system that used individual instruments like “the promissory note and the bill of exchange.”
79
 
Goods were made slowly and moved slowly through the economy; there was little need for large-
scale distribution other than in imperial overseas trading.
80
 Telegraph and radio were in early 
development, and there were no mass media organizations of which to speak beyond newspapers. 
The large corporate establishment remained a rarity: rather, “the home, farm, and workshop still 
ruled the early nineteenth- century economy.”
81
 
At the end of the eighteen-seventies, however, technological development and fossil fuel 
extraction inaugurated industrialism by freeing production and distribution from the limits of 
human, animal, wind, and waterpower.
82
 Consequently, average daily business activity began to 
exceed what small, personally owned and managed enterprises could easily handle.
83
 Successful 
adaptors were those businesses that could “vertically integrate” production and distribution under 
one managerial apparatus.
84
 Incorporation was particularly suited to this type of organizational 
growth: it could tie multiple business operations—purchasing, production, marketing, and 
distribution—together under one corporate umbrella and meet expanding capital needs through 
the sale of stock.
85
 The small firm of the nineteenth century was unable to do these tasks with any 
economy of scale; and, by the beginning of the twentieth century, the partnership form of 
organization was obsolete. The “integrated industrial enterprise,” in comparison, had “become the 
most powerful institution in American business and, indeed, in the entire American economy.”
86
 
Railroad firms were the prototypes of these modern complex organizations. They arose 
earlier than in industrial production because of the particular capital demands of infrastructure 
expansion by rail.
87
 Although government bonding had facilitated the creation of a canal system 
among the inland waterways of the east coast during the early nineteenth century, this manner of 
financing infrastructure fell far short of the capital outlays needed to build a national network of 
railroads.
88
 Railroads had to be financed in New York City through the sale of corporate bonds 
and stock.
89
 By 1859, investment in the securities of railroad corporations exceeded $1,100 
million, and by the start of 1870 there were 70,000 miles of track in operation in the United 
States; by 1900, close to 200,000 miles.
90
 
                                                                
79  Id. at 22.  
80  Id. at 17. 
81
 RODGERS, supra note 36, at 20. 
82  CHANDLER, supra note 41, at 17, 285-86, 485, 76 (discussing the opening of the anthracite coal fields in 
eastern Pennsylvania). 
83  See CHANDLER, supra note 41, at 348, 363-64. 
84  See id. 
85  Id. at 1, 285–86. 
86  Id. at 286. 
87  CHANDLER, supra note 41, at 81-121 (discussing the rise of the railroad). 
88  The total expenditures for canals between 1815 and 1860 was $188 million, of which seventy-three 
percent was supplied by state and municipal bonds; the New York Central alone, a regional railroad, had over $28 million 
invested in road and equipment by 1855. GALAMBOS, supra note 1, at 6; CHANDLER, supra note 41, at 90. 
89  CHANDLER, supra note 41, at 91.   
90  Id. at 88-90.   
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The rise of the railroads threw into disarray a prevailing legal paradigm for determining 
where corporations could sue and be sued. That situation is illustrated by an early nineteenth 
century case, Bank of the United States v. Deveaux.
91
 Deveaux, a lawyer acting with Georgia 
officials, forcibly collected two thousand dollars in payment of state taxes from a branch of the 
incorporated national bank located in Savannah.
92
 The bank sued for damages in federal court 
despite Deveaux’s crimes of trespass and theft being matters of state law. Deveaux responded that 
the bank was not a “citizen” within the meaning of Article III of the Constitution and was thereby 
not entitled to diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts.
93
 
Justice Marshall, again writing for the Court, reasoned that an organization “indeed, 
cannot be an alien or a citizen; but the persons whom it represents may be the one or the other.”
94
 
This directed the jurisdictional inquiry to the residences of a corporation’s shareholders “as a 
subject which the court can inspect.”
95
 If the shareholders were foreign aliens or citizens of a 
different state from the opposing party in a suit by or against a corporation in which they held 
shares, the controversy came “within the spirit and terms of the jurisdiction conferred” by Article 
III.
96
 If they were citizens of the same state, it did not. Since no shareholder of the national bank 
resided in Georgia, Justice Marshall found that the bank was diverse to Deveaux and its suit 
against him could proceed in federal court.
97
 
Railroad corporations, however, substantially problematized this method for determining 
jurisdiction. They operated thousands of miles of track over the boundaries of several states and, 
to raise capital for this vast infrastructure, sold stock on national exchanges, scattering their 
shareholders across the nation. Under Deveaux, in suits concerning a corporation and a resident of 
a state, federal diversity jurisdiction was destroyed in any state in which a single shareholder 
resided. Thus, insofar as railroad development was contingent on litigation outcomes, as the land 
practices that railroad corporations employed suggest,
98
 Deveaux consigned the fate of these 
organizations to precisely those state courts unlikely to favor a national imperative for westward 
expansion over their own state interests. 
As the railroads became more prominent, however, the Supreme Court began to link 
these national interests to its reasoning about organizational freedom of action. In 1839, it 
described railroad corporations as advancing “[o]ne of the most important objects and interests for 
                                                                
91  Bank of U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809), overruled by Louisville, Cincinnati, & Charleston 
R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (1 How.) 497 (1844).   
92  Deveaux, 9 U.S. at 62.   
93  Article III provides that the Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction over disputes arising between citizens 
of different states. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
94  Deveaux, 9 U.S. at 87. 
95  Id. at 90. 
96  Id. at 87-88. 
97  Id. at 91-92. 
98  See, e.g., JAMES DABNEY MCCABE, HISTORY OF THE GRANGE MOVEMENT; or, THE FARMER’S WAR 
AGAINST MONOPOLIES: BEING A FULL AND AUTHENTIC ACCOUNT OF THE STRUGGLES OF THE AMERICAN FARMERS 
AGAINST THE EXTORTIONS OF THE RAILROAD COMPANIES 132-65 (1873) (giving an account of the ability of  “railroad 
men” to capture and use the court system to their benefit). 
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the preservation of the Union.”
99
 It explained that “associated capital” was “essentially necessary” 
for infrastructure development in the United States, which lacked the “large individual 
accumulations” found in Europe consequent to longstanding generational wealth.
100
 Under this 
reasoning, the Court held bills of exchange drawn by railroad corporations to be contracts 
enforceable in any state.
101
 To do otherwise, it explained, would be “injurious . . . to the 
operations of commerce, and the creation and improvement of the facilities of intercourse.”
102
 
Thus the Supreme Court linked a technological imperative for infrastructure development to its 
legal reasoning about the scope of railroad corporations’ freedom of action in a westward-
expanding United States. We will see a similar type of linkage with technology in its 
jurisprudence about organizational freedom of political speech in the twentieth century.
103
 
In 1844, the Court overturned Deveaux, the railroad-obstructive case, in Louisville, 
Cincinnati, and Charleston Railroad Company v. Letson, which articulated what scholars would 
later identify as a new “entity theory” of the corporation.
104
 The Letson Court rejected the view 
that a corporation was a mere legal fiction—artificial, intangible, and existing only in 
contemplation of law—stating instead that a corporation was “capable of being treated as a citizen 
of [a] state, as much as a natural person,” and thus its residence for jurisdictional purposes could 
be determined by simply looking at the state of its incorporation.
105
 The law of jurisdiction, the 
Court admonished, must “comprehend citizens universally, in all the relations of trade,” and not 
only in the increasingly obsolete forms of the earlier part of the century: “such relations of 
business as may arise from their individual or partnership transactions.”
106
 Later, in Marshall v. 
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, the Court reaffirmed that “a citizen who has made a 
contract, and has a ‘controversy’ with a corporation . . . [does] not deal with a mere metaphysical 
abstraction” akin to that described by Justice Marshall in the earlier part of the century.
107
 
The entity theory was not without its detractors, however. One in particular keenly 
identified a technological imperative as driving the theory forward on the Court. A Virginia 
lawyer nominated to the Court by Martin Van Buren,
108
 Justice Daniel vigorously criticized 
Letson in Marshall v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, ominously warning that it would 
create a “new class of citizen corporations” and, by a “rite of judicial baptism,” set them free from 
“the thralldom of constitutional restriction.”
109
 Daniel associated the Court’s shift towards the 
                                                                
99 Bank of Augusta, 38 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 526. 
100  Id. at 524. 
101  Id. at 525-26.  
102  Id. at 524. 
103  See infra Part II, pp. 421-432.   
104  Louisville, Cincinnati, & Charleston R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (1 How.) 497 (1844). See HORWITZ, supra 
note 9, at 71-72. 
105  Letson, 43 U.S. at 558. 
106  Id. at 553 (emphasis added). 
107  57 U.S. 314, 327 (1853); compare Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. at 543. 
108  Biographies of the Robes: Peter Vivian Daniel, PBS.ORG, 
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/supremecourt/personality/robes_daniel.html (last visited Jun. 13, 2015). 
109  Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 57 U.S. (1 How.) 314, 343-44 (1853) (Daniel, J., dissenting). Daniel 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol18/iss5/2
ROBINSON_SHIFTED PERSONHOOD_FORMATTED_FINALFINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/11/2016  10:03 AM 
2016] SHIFTED PERSONHOOD 417 
entity theory with the technological drive towards railroad expansion. Deveaux, in his view, was 
therefore not rejected for being constitutionally flawed, but for being “wholly behind the sagacity 
and requirements of the age.”
110
 Thus where the majority of the Court had before emphasized the 
importance of corporations for “the creation and improvement of the facilities of [commercial] 
intercourse,”
111
 Daniel charged it with placing a “new morality” at the center of its jurisprudence: 
one by which it was willing to modify “the mandates or axioms of the Constitution, when found 
obstructing the way to power” in a new technological age.
112
 
Thus the oft-cited 1886 case “establishing” corporate personhood, Santa Clara v. 
Southern Pacific Railroad, is but a mile-marker in the history of judicial accommodation of new 
forms of organization within constitutional jurisprudence, because the mid-century railroad cases 
well-preceded Santa Clara in establishing the entity theory.
113
 In Santa Clara, the Supreme Court 
would therefore simply direct a functionary (its court reporter) to dispense with the challenge that 
railroad corporations were not entitled to constitutional guarantees aimed to benefit former slaves 
after the Civil War. The reporter dutifully wrote: 
The court does not wish to hear argument on the question of whether the 
provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which forbids a 
State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws, applies to corporations. We are all of the opinion that it does.
114
 
Letson marks an elemental phase in what this Article describes as “shifted personhood” 
between organizations and individuals within the constitutional order: Santa Clara is merely 
evidence the shift had already occurred. This is apparent in other cases of that era, as in the 1891 
transit case Crutcher v. Kentucky, in which the Supreme Court held that “the accession of mere 
corporate facilities, as a matter of convenience in carrying on their business, cannot have the 
effect of depriving [the incorporators] of. . . [a] right.”
115
 Although it was speaking not of the 
individuals but of the organization, the Court noted that “[t]o carry on interstate commerce, is not 
                                                                
wrote that Letson’s holding carried the word citizen “beyond either its philological, technical, political, or vulgar 
acceptation,” when there were reasonable alternatives, such as viewing a corporation as the equivalent of a legal alien: 
endowed with certain rights but constrained in others. Id. at 339-40. 
110  Id. at 346 (Daniel, J., dissenting). 
111  Bank of Augusta, 38 U.S. at 524. 
112  Marshall, 57 U.S. at 346. 
113  Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).   
114  Santa Clara, 118 U.S. at 396. The case concerned the Atlantic & Pacific Railroad, which was 
incorporated in 1866 by an act of Congress to “construct and maintain, by certain designated routes, a continuous railroad 
and telegraph line from Springfield, Missouri, to the Pacific,” for the purpose of “securing the safe and speedy 
transportation of mails, troops, munitions of war, and public stores.” The Southern Pacific undertook to extend the A&P 
line; however, by 1875, it was indebted for large sums of money secured by a mortgage on over eleven million acres of 
land. It failed to pay taxes on three thousand acres located in Santa Clara County and argued that the provisions of 
California tax law imposed “unequal burdens” in violation of the equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Id. at 398, 401-05, 409. 
115  Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47, 54 (1891) (finding a state requirement that common carriers file 
proof of a certain value in capital stock when travelling through the state unconstitutional). 
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a franchise or a privilege granted by the state; it is a right which every citizen of the United States 
is entitled to exercise under the constitution and laws of the United States.”
116
 
This kind of reasoning drives the holding concerning religious freedom a century later in 
Hobby Lobby, for example, where the Court articulated that “[w]hen rights, whether constitutional 
or statutory, are extended to corporations, the purpose is to protect the rights of these people [the 
incorporators].”
117
 Similarly, in 2010, the Court used a biological metaphor to explain Letson’s 
jurisdictional calculus, instructing litigants to look for a corporation’s “nerve center” to determine 
where that organization could be sued, and suggested its features are as intrinsic to it as to a living 
being.
118
 The same year, the Court in Citizens United equated the speech rights of corporations to 
individuals, finding “no basis for the proposition that, in the context of political speech, the 
government may impose restrictions on certain disfavored speakers.”
119
 
The only way to commensurate these statements with their holdings is by concluding that 
a fuller complement of the rights of personhood has “shifted” from individuals to organizations 
since the time that Alexander Hamilton described corporations’ rights as limited to only those 
granted by the state.
120
 It is the widening of what has shifted, from contractual freedoms (the 
subject of the nineteenth century cases), to freedoms of conscience, such as of political expression 
(in Citizens United) and religious free exercise (in Hobby Lobby), that would make the relatively 
old and established concept of “corporate personhood” reappear as something new and 
controversial in the early twenty-first century. 
C. The Supreme Court, the Organizational Society, and the Technological Imperative 
By the end of the twentieth century, nearly six million corporations had come into 
existence in the United States.
121
 These corporations brought with them managerial capitalism: 
they employed hundreds and even thousands of middle and top managers who supervised the 
work of dozens and often hundreds of operating units, consisting of tens and often hundreds of 
thousands of employees.
122
 These employees had largely no stake in the organization other than 
their wages, and, by that definition, they were easily replaceable.
123
 This was one of the facts 
about industrialism that would bring about an organizational transformation of government in the 
United States during the twentieth century, rivaling that which had occurred in the private sector. 
                                                                
116  Id. 
117  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2769 (2014). 
118  Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 93 (2010) (concluding that “in practice it should normally be the 
place where the corporation maintains its headquarters—provided that the headquarters is the actual center of direction, 
control, and coordination, i.e., the ‘nerve center’”). 
119  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 314.  
120  See supra, note 40 and associated text. For an extensive treatment of the shift from the “grant” to 
“entity” theory in American legal thought, see HORWITZ, supra note 75 [1870-1960 volume], at 70-76 (and particularly, 
Chapter 3). 
121  There were approximately 5.85 million corporate federal income tax filers in 2008. U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, Statistical Abstract of the United States:  2012 491 tbl.744 (2012). 
122  CHANDLER, supra note 41, at 1-3 (concluding that “modern business enterprise . . . employs a hierarchy 
of middle and top salaried managers to monitor and coordinate the work of the units under its control.”). 
123  See, e.g., id. at  8 (noting in part that “[m]en came and went.  The institution and its offices remained”). 
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Industrialism called into question the “Jeffersonian conviction that political liberty was 
safe only where no man was economically beholden to another.”
124
 While it spread employment 
widely, working conditions were typically egregious.
125
 Whole industries relied on child labor.
126
 
Labor unrest produced strikes, riots, and fertile grounds for anarchism by the turn of the century; 
President McKinley was assassinated in 1901 in association with suppression of a workers’ strike 
at the American Steel and Wire Company.
127
 Financial markets were deeply unstable and the 
Great Depression was among a series of major economic crises experienced in the United States 
after 1880.
128
 Control of the new industrial organizations via governmental regulation of 
workplace safety, ages of employment, wages, hours, pensions, and speculation in the market 
became a central domestic policy issue in the United States during the first decades of the 
twentieth century. 
Advocating for a new “administrative process” to regulate the market and workplace, 
New Deal bureaucrat James Landis argued that the Jeffersonian ideal was obsolete, due to 
technological modernization: 
The rise of industrialism . . . brought new and difficult problems to government. 
A world that scarcely a hundred years ago could listen to Wordsworth’s 
denunciation of railroads because their building despoiled the beauty of his 
northern landscapes is different, very different, from one that in 1938 has to 
determine lanes and flight levels for air traffic.
129
 
In place of Wordsworth’s ideals (and Jefferson’s), Landis described the emergence 
among the American public of a “view which conceives it to be a function of government to 
maintain a continuing concern with and control over the economic forces which affect the life of 
the community.”
130
 Landis and other proponents of the organizational transformation of 
government urged that it was the only thing that could counterbalance the great power and 
effectiveness of the organizations that had emerged in society at large, exercising what economist 
John Kenneth Galbraith would later call “countervailing power.”
131
 
                                                                
124  RODGERS, supra note 36, at 33. Also, this is the thesis of Professor Reich’s widely-cited article. See 
generally Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). 
125  See, e.g., 141 Men and Girls Die in Waist Factory Fire; Trapped High Up in Washington Place 
Building; Street Strewn with Bodies; Piles of Dead Inside, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1911, at 2 (describing the infamous 
Triangle Shirtwaist Factory fire).   
126  See generally American Academy of Political and Social Science, Child Employing Industries, in 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. (Vol. 35 & Supp. Mar. 1910).   
127  See GALAMBOS, supra note 1, at 222; MARSHALL EVERETT, COMPLETE LIFE OF WILLIAM MCKINLEY 
AND STORY OF HIS ASSASSINATION (1901). 
128  There were panics in 1873, 1893, 1903, and 1907, and depressions in 1885, 1893-97, and 1913-14. See 
HORWITZ, supra note 75, at 65-66; GALAMBOS, supra note 1, at 117, 222.   
129  LANDIS, supra note 42, at 7. 
130  LANDIS, supra note 42, at 8. Landis served as a member of the Federal Trade Commission, chairman of 
the Securities and Exchange Commission, and dean of Harvard Law School. See generally THOMAS MCCRAW, PROPHETS 
OF REGULATION: CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, JAMES M. LANDIS, AND ALFRED KAHN (1984). 
131  JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM 108-23 (1952) (describing countervailing power); 
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Professionally insulated from the emergent conditions of industrial working life, the 
Supreme Court continued to embrace laissez faire economic theory in its constitutional 
interpretation, blocking implementation of the managed society policies of the New Deal until the 
1930s.
132
 After it dropped this resistance, from 1930 to 1935, Congress built a formidable stable 
of administrative organizations in government to address such issues as monopolization, securities 
fraud, market speculation, public services, utilities, dangerous industries, and social welfare. To 
staff these organizations, it expanded the total workforce of the federal government by nearly two 
hundred percent between 1930 and 1950.
133
 In 1946, the Administrative Procedure Act laid a 
statutory framework for the creation of further organizations to meet the needs of contemporary 
times as they arose,
134
 and by 1970, non-defense agencies within the federal government 
employed almost three million people and accounted for more than one-fifth of the gross domestic 
product.
135
 That year the Department of Agriculture alone employed more persons than had 
worked for the entire federal government in 1881.
136
 
Yet the idea of organizational formation as a new way to power was not limited to 
government alone. The extensive rise of nonprofit and “nongovernmental” organizations during 
the twentieth century formed yet another “associational revolution” rivaling the earlier 
development of the nation state, in the assessment of some historians.
137
 The formation of unions, 
professional associations, and other kinds of mass membership organizations for advocacy, and 
the widespread emergence of clubs for leisure (satirically portrayed by Sinclair Lewis in 1922’s 
Babbitt),
138
 were twentieth-century vehicles for the progressive new middle class minted by 
industrialism to “fulfill its destiny through bureaucratic means.”
139
 Later twentieth-century 
                                                                
see also MICHAEL SANDEL, PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY: ESSAYS ON MORALITY IN POLITICS 170 (2005) (“If democracy was to 
survive, the concentration of economic power would have to be met by a similar concentration of political power.”). 
132  Compare Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating New York’s regulation of maximum 
hours in the baking industry to sixty per week and ten per day), with West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) 
(upholding a state minimum wage regulation for women), and United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding the 
federal Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, setting maximum working hours and minimum wages).  Much has been made of 
Roosevelt’s “court packing” threat in the Judicial Procedures Reform Bill of 1937; however, the bill never passed for a 
variety of reasons that appear to have little to do with the fabled “switch in time that saved nine.” See MARIAN C. 
MCKENNA, FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT AND THE GREAT CONSTITUTIONAL WAR: THE COURT-PACKING CRISIS OF 1937 435-36 
(2002). In particular, the Senate majority leader charged with the bill’s passage, and a likely appointee to an expanded 
Court, died unexpectedly. Id. at 505. 
133  COCHRAN, supra note 35, at 320.  
134  Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 500 
(2012)). 
135  GALAMBOS, supra note 1, at 3-4. 
136  Id. People who grew up in Washington, as I did, know that the entire administration of the federal 
government was once housed in the Eisenhower Executive Office Building, next to the White House. Now the grand 
buildings of Constitution Avenue all contain administrative agencies, as do extensive parts of Washington, and Maryland 
and Virginia surrounding.   
137  SALAMON, supra note 43, at 243. 
138  SINCLAIR LEWIS, BABBITT 155 (Dover Thrift ed., Dover Publications) (2003) (describes the protagonist’s 
“clubs and associations” as “food comfortable to his spirit”). 
139  ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER, 1877-1920 166 (Donald David ed., 1967); see also 
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scholars widely confirmed the observation of early twentieth-century sociologist Max Weber: 
organizations were taking center stage across all the industrializing societies of the twentieth 
century—not only in business, but also in “church and state, of armies, political parties . . . 
organizations to promote all kinds of causes, private associations, clubs, and many others.”
140
 
Empirical work showed how as these societies urbanized and became more populous,
141
 they 
increasingly relied on organizations for social cohesion,
142
 security,
143
 governance,
144
 and 
economic growth.
145
 Historian Robert Wiebe summed up the cause of this much organizational 
formation as a new kind of “bureaucratic orientation”
146
 that found organizations “peculiarly 
suited to the fluidity and impersonality of an urban-industrial world.”
147
 By 1974, forty-nine of 
the one hundred largest economic units in the world were nations and fifty-one were international 
corporations,
148
 and by the end of the twentieth century, the growth of nonprofit corporations 
outstripped the growth of the population in the United States.
149
 Organization studies emerged as 
a whole new field of social science dedicated to the study of these new, collective actors in human 
society.
150
 
Thus, between the time of Dartmouth College and Citizens United, a deep preindustrial 
                                                                
PUTNAM, supra note 45. 
140  MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 337 (Talcott Parsons ed., A.M. 
Henderson trans., 1947). 
141  See LEWIS MUMFORD, THE CULTURE OF CITIES 225-26 (1938) (“In 1800, not a city in the Western 
World had over a million in population . . . . [B]y 1900, eleven metropolises with more than a million inhabitants had 
come into existence . . . . Thirty years later . . . . there were twenty-seven [such] cities.”); UNITED NATIONS POPULATION 
FUND, THE STATE OF WORLD POPULATION  2011 121 (2011) (reporting that an equal portion of the world’s population 
resided in urban and rural environments during the first decade of the twenty-first century). 
142  See PUTNAM, supra note 45, at 59-64 (2000) (describing the decline of local civic clubs and rise of mass 
membership organizations during the second half of the twentieth century). 
143  See ULRICH BECK, RISK SOCIETY: TOWARDS A NEW MODERNITY 21, 131-32 (Mike Featherstone ed., 
Mark Ritter trans., 1992) (describing modernity’s particular hazards and insecurities as producing specific forms of post-
industrial organization).  
144  See LANDIS, supra note 42, at 14 (describing the need for a twentieth-century administrative state 
characterized by specialized organizations: “administrative agencies”).  
145  See generally CHANDLER, supra note 41 (describing the emergence of new organizational forms of 
managerial capitalism at the turn of the last century). 
146   See WIEBE, supra note 139, at 295. 
147  Id. at 145.  
148  TRACHTENBERG, supra note 2, at 5.  
149  FUKUYAMA, supra note 44, at 54 (citing a Department of Commerce survey counting 201,000 nonprofit 
organizations, unions, groups, and clubs in the U.S. in 1949, and 1.14 million nonprofit organizations in 1989).  
150  See, e.g., W. G. Astley & A. H. Van de Ven, Central Perspectives and Debates in Organization Theory, 
28 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 2 (1983). (discussing various debates surrounding four basic views that represent different concepts of 
organizational theory); see also Graeme Salaman & Kenneth Thompson, Editors’ Introduction to CONTROL AND 
IDEOLOGY IN ORGANIZATIONS vii, vii (Graeme Salaman & Kenneth Thompson eds., 1980) (describing an introduction to 
the analysis of modern organizations and the processes of organizational control). 
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connection between individual activity and work, governance, advocacy, and even leisure was 
severed in the United States. By the end of the twentieth century, historian Louis Galambos would 
conclude that “[m]ost of the things that most of us do each day are either accomplished directly 
within this type of administrative network or are indirectly dependent upon the activities of the 
great modern organizations surrounding us.”
151
 Analyzing shifts in the content of eleven special 
interest magazines over sixty years, Galambos reported that the new “emphasis in this value 
system was on organizational achievement” and success was increasingly looked upon as 
organizational, not as individual.
152
 That represented a marked shift from the individualist outlook 
of the nineteenth century, which was organized, to the contrary, around an “optimistic belief in 
the effectiveness of individual effort.”
153
 
Like the culture surrounding it, the Supreme Court solved the crisis the widespread rise 
of organizations posed for a constitutional jurisprudence grounded in liberal individualism, by 
shifting to accommodate the new organizational forms.
154
 In the law of jurisdiction (or “in 
jurisdictional analysis”), this occurred during a period of mid- to late-nineteenth century 
American progress deeply entwined with new technologies of movement.
155
 To determine where 
an incorporated organization could sue and be sued in the early nineteenth century, the Supreme 
Court looked to the physical location of the shareholders,
156
 but this concept proved unworkable 
by mid-century with the rise of new kinds of organizations—vertically-integrated corporations—
that undertook the long-range movement of people and goods across several states using 
technologies like the steam engine. Railroad corporations’ presence in American life was 
undeniably more than “artificial:” they had a tangible infrastructure of tens of thousands of miles 
of track, an employment of thousands, and a capitalization of millions of dollars in stock held by 
tens of thousands of shareholders across the nation. Basing jurisdiction on the location of these 
shareholders was deeply problematic for the forward progress of westward expansion, because it 
meant that railroads had to litigate primarily in state courts. 
Incorporated organizations and railroad technology were closely aligned because of the 
particular need to aggregate large sums of capital to develop this kind of infrastructure. Noting the 
lack in the United States of large aristocratic fortunes, the Supreme Court remarked that only an 
antiquated view would recognize citizens only in obsolete forms like individual or partnership 
                                                                
151  GALAMBOS, supra note 1, at 3. 
152  Id. at 221; but see J. Morgan Kousser, Louis Galambos’s The Public Image of Big Business in America 
1880-1940: A Quantitative Study in Social Change, 63 J. AMER. HIST. 437-38 (1975) (book review) (critiquing 
Galambos’s methodology as “pseudo-statistical,” “impressionistic,” and underwritten by the assumption that his published 
sources “reflect rather than produce mass attitudes.”). 
153  COCHRAN, supra note 35, at 170.  
154  See HORWITZ, supra note 9, at 72 (“The corporation, in short, was the most powerful and prominent 
example of the emergence of non-individualistic, or if you will, collectivist legal institutions . . . . In all the Western 
countries, therefore, the sudden focus on theories of corporate personality was associated with a crisis of legitimacy in 
liberal individualism arising from the recent emergence of powerful collective institutions.”). See generally Bank of 
Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (1 Pet.) 519 (1839); Louisville, Cincinnati, & Charleston R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (1 How.) 497 
(1844); Marshall v. Baltimore and Ohio R.R., 57 U.S. (1 How.) 314 (1853); Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 
(1886); all discussed supra pp. 401-420. 
155  For a visual illustration of this shift see John Gast’s artwork, American Progress (1872), available at 
https://aras.org/sites/default/files/docs/00043AmericanProgress.pdf (last visited Dec. 26, 2014). 
156  Deveaux, 9 U.S. at 61, discussed supra p. 412-416. 
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transactions by which they had no possibility of accumulating the capital necessary to build 
modern infrastructures. By 1906, it would extend this conclusion to the economy as a whole, 
simply stating: “Corporations are a necessary feature of modern business activity, and their 
aggregated capital has become the source of nearly all great enterprises.”
157
 
Thus we see a complex relationship between technology, organizations, and law 
emerging in disputes about jurisdiction concerning railroad corporations. In this context, 
jurisprudence can prove as plastic as technological shifts. The Supreme Court solved the problem 
that railroads posed for jurisdiction by adopting the organizational consciousness that was 
emerging in the United States during industrialism in place of its earlier narrative of self-sufficient 
individualism. The Court determined that an incorporated organization was no longer something 
“immaterial” or “intangible” per John Marshall’s conception, but an entity in its own right.
158
 This 
response can be understood as part of what Professor Horwitz described as a broader cultural 
effort to “express the reality of groups” in an increasingly populous, technological, and 
organizational society in during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.
159
 
II. HERE COMES TELEVISION 
As Thomas Kuhn found in the case of scientific revolutions, a shock to the assumptions 
on which an analytic paradigm is based will result in a paradigm shift to accommodate newly 
discovered realities once enough new facts accumulate to make prior paradigmatic explanations 
implausible.
160
 This section identifies an analogous shift in law, similar to the one we have just 
seen concerning the railroads and jurisdiction.  This shift responds to new realities for political 
discourse posed by an era of technologically mediated communication and the organizations that 
could afford to participate in it. 
The emergence of mass media, and particularly television, undercut an assumption of the 
Founding period that individuals and the expressly named “press” of the First Amendment would 
function as the primary discursive units of the body politic.
161
 This section reads a line of 
Supreme Court cases that respond over a half-century to the emergence of television in political 
discourse. These cases show how the Court came to believe that society had become dependent on 
television to inform its viewpoints, recognized that primarily only organizations could afford to 
produce mass technologically mediated speech under these conditions, and reflexively adapted the 
legal paradigm for constitutional protection of political expression to include them. This is 
analogous to its earlier adaptation of the paradigm for jurisdiction to accommodate corporations 
based on the Court’s perception of their necessity for infrastructure development by rail. 
                                                                
157  Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906). 
158  Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. at 543.  
159  HORWITZ, supra note 9 [1870-1960 volume], at 101 (describing “the most powerful of these early 
efforts to express the reality of groups” as Ernst Freund’s The Legal Nature of Corporations (1897)); see also id., at 71 
(discussing questions regarding “the reality of groups”). 
160  See generally THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962) (arguing that 
scientific progress is not always a story of accumulation but rather of discovering anomalies and challenging old ways of 
thinking). 
161  U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press.”). 
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To historically associate the modern corporate form of ownership with the technological 
development of mass communication, we must begin with the problem of the early industrial 
producers. The development of continuous-process machinery in the 1880s exponentially 
increased the speed and quantity of production in nearly every industry.
162
 The absence of a 
correlate culture of mass consumption, however, meant that producers’ problem was not one of 
output, but of sales.
163
 The U.S. workforce was largely mass employed and wage-earning by the 
early twentieth century, yet it needed an education in how to spend its newly discretionary income 
on ready-made goods. It received this education from advertising. Radio, and later, television, 
enabled sellers to reach consumers in their homes without ever having to send a salesman to 
knock on their doors.
164
 
Television’s uptake was particularly rapid. In 1945, there were seven thousand television 
sets in U.S. homes, by 1952, twenty million sets, and before the close of the century, at least one 
television in ninety-eight percent of homes and two or more in greater than half.
165
 In comparison 
to nineteenth-century mechanization, therefore, which made its primary impact on the workplace, 
twentieth-century mass media was culturally much more impactful on the activities of 
entertainment, leisure, and consumption at home. 
For this reason, political persuaders quickly adopted television.
166
 In 1952, Dwight 
Eisenhower became the first presidential contender to air political advertisements on television. 
New Yorker writer George Trow described the effect of Eisenhower’s unprecedented “electronic 
campaign,” stating that “[t]he power shifted . . . from General Eisenhower to someone called Ike, 
who embodied certain aspects of General Eisenhower and certain aspects of affection for General 
Eisenhower.”
167
 Presidential candidate Adlai Stevenson, who refused to appear on television to 
“merchandise” himself “like breakfast cereal,” described it as “the ultimate indignity to the 
democratic process.”
168
 Nonetheless, after being defeated by Eisenhower in 1952, Stevenson went 
                                                                
162  CHANDLER, supra note 41, at 289 (exploring the “most dramatic examples of mass production and mass 
distribution”). 
163  Id. at 335 (arguing that output sourcing became a challenge and citing an industry executive who stated 
that, “[k]nowing that we had something that the consumer wanted, we had to advise the consumer of its existence. We did 
this by extensive advertising.”).    
164  Of the pioneers of early twentieth century industrial production and advertising, many maintain the 
status of “household names” today, such as Heinz, Campbell, Ivory, and Pillsbury. Id. at 297, 335 (listing well-known 
brands in the rise of public consumption of cigarettes, matches, flour, breakfast cereals, canned milk and soup).   
165  The uptake of television has not slowed. In 1996, the eighteen-inch digital satellite dish became the most 
sold electronic device in history after the VCR. History of Television, HISTORY OF FILM, TELEVISION, & VIDEO, 
http://www.high-techproductions.com/historyoftelevision.htm (last visited Jun. 13, 2015). 
166  See DAN NIMMO, THE POLITICAL PERSUADERS: THE TECHNIQUES OF MODERN ELECTION CAMPAIGNS 
137 (1970) (arguing that despite use of other forms of media, “it is television that distinguishes modern campaign 
communication” from prior campaigns); See generally JAY G. BLUMLER & DENIS MCQUAIL, TELEVISION IN POLITICS: ITS 
USES AND INFLUENCES (1968) (exploring the role of television in elections and political campaigns). 
167  GEORGE TROW, WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF NO CONTEXT 46 (1981).   
168  Adlai Stevenson, U.S. Presidential Candidate, Speech at the Democratic National Convention (Aug. 18, 
1956). Stevenson’s “breakfast cereal” prediction was accurate. See Jeff Zeleney, The Up-Close-and-Personal Candidate? 
A Thing of the Past, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2011, at A22, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/01/us/politics/presidential-candidates-make-fewer-in-person-appearances.html 
(describing how recent political candidates have used “their campaigns as promotional tours for books, movies, and their 
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on to produce television ads to challenge Eisenhower’s incumbency in 1956.
169
 Television 
became mainstream in political campaigning. 
The most significant change that television made in politics was to substantially increase 
the cost of running for public office. As early as 1955, the premium rate for a network 
advertisement was four thousand dollars per minute,
170
 and by 1960, presidential contenders were 
spending tens of millions of dollars on televised campaigning.
171
 This figure nearly tripled before 
the end of the decade, and by 2012, it was sixteen-fold after only three weeks of advertising 
during the presidential contest.
172
 
Certainly, money in politics was nothing new. The question for the second half of the 
twentieth century was whether longstanding regulations of financial contributions and 
expenditures could continue to control influence-peddling in politics in spite of new technologies 
for mass communication. 
A. Money in Politics is Not New; It’s Old 
The concentration of wealth consequent upon the industrial expansion in the 
post-Civil War era had profound implications for American life . . . . 
[A]ggregated capital unduly influenced politics, an influence not stopping short 
of corruption.
173
 
Congress passed the first legislation regulating aggregated capital in politics in 1907, 
when it made it unlawful for “any corporation whatever to make a money contribution in 
connection with any election . . . .”
174
 This was a direct reaction to the concentration of wealth in 
industrial corporations during the early twentieth century. In the 1921 case of Newberry v. United 
States, for example, Truman Newberry was indicted for exceeding federal campaign expenditure 
limits by ten-fold while competing against the automobile manufacturer Henry Ford in 
Michigan’s 1918 Democratic Senate primary.
175
 Newberry spent this sum hiring detectives to 
investigate Ford, compensating obstructionist candidates to run against him, and bribing election 
                                                                
own personal brands”).  
169  Larry J. Sabato, Help! I’m Drowning in TV Ads!, POLITICO (Apr. 28, 2014), 
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/04/help-im-drowning-in-tv-ads-
106114_full.html?IEDc8EAw#.VKIEkM8EAw.  
170  History of Television, supra note 165. 
171  See id. (noting that presidential campaign advertising in 1968 was $27 million). 
172  See Wesleyan Media Project, 2012 Shatters 2004 and 2008 Records for Total Ads Aired (Oct. 24, 2012), 
http://mediaproject.wesleyan.edu/2012/10/24/2012-shatters-2004-and-2008-records-for-total-ads-aired/ (reporting the total 
amount spent from October 1-21 by candidates, parties, and outside groups on presidential advertising in 2012 as 
$164,575,210). 
173  United States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 570 (1957). 
174  Corporations were subject to fines of up to five thousand dollars, and corporate directors faced up to one 
year in prison. Tillman Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 34 Stat. 864 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006)). 
175  See Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 247-49, n.2 (1921) (explaining that Newberry willfully 
violated election law by contributing and expending more money than lawfully allowed in a political campaign).   
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officials and voters.
176
 At the same time, Ford also ran in the Republican primary, reducing the 
general election to mere form if he were victorious in both.
177
 
The Supreme Court dismissed Newberry’s indictment yet expressed serious concern 
about unregulated money in politics.
178
 That concern was central to Burroughs v. United States, 
which involved a failure to report $58,000 in campaign contributions received during the 1928 
contest for the Democratic presidential nomination.
179
 The Court described this corruption, if 
recurrent, as “giv[ing] omen of danger” and stated that “the free use of money in elections, arising 
from the vast growth of recent wealth . . . . present[ed] equal cause for anxiety.”
180
 Congress, the 
Court emphasized, bore a responsibility to preserve the purity of elections: “To say that Congress 
is without power to pass appropriate legislation to safeguard such an election from the improper 
use of money to influence the result is to deny to the nation in a vital particular the power of self-
protection.”
181
 
The 1944 presidential election demonstrated that political influencers could circumvent 
such safeguards by making expenditures on behalf of favored candidates and parties, instead of 
making contributions directly to them.
182
 Congress prohibited such expenditures as “indirect 
contributions” in 1947.
183
 The first challenge came in 1948 in United States v. Congress of 
Industrial Organizations (“CIO”).
184
 The CIO, a labor union, was indicted for urging its members 
to vote for a specified candidate for Congress on the front page of its weekly newsletter.
185
 The 
union argued that calling this newsletter an “indirect contribution” to the candidate infringed its 
“rights of free speech, free press and free assemblage, guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.”
186
 The 
                                                                
176  Id. (listing the “purposes, objects and things” Newberry spent his money on).  
177  Id. at 269 (White, J., dissenting) (stating that “[if Ford] had been successful as to both [primaries], the 
subsequent election would have been reduced to the merest form”). 
178  The majority found that the regulation of primary contests was not within Congress’s power. Id. at 258. 
The dissenters, while acknowledging that primaries were unknown when the Constitution was framed, pointed out that 
primaries had become the most determinative part of elections. See id. at 266-68 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 285 (Pitney, 
J., concurring in part). This view prevailed by mid-century. See, e.g., United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 317 (1941) 
(stating that primaries “are a step in the exercise by the people of their choice of representatives in Congress.”). 
179  See Burroughs v. United States, 65 F.2d 796, 798 (D.C. Cir. 1933). 
180  Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 547 (1934) (quoting The Ku Klux Cases, 110 U.S. 651, 666-
67 (1884)). 
181  Id. at 545. 
182  For a discussion of how the word “contribution” was interpreted in investigations of the 1944 
presidential campaign, see United States v. Cong. of Indus. Org., 335 U.S. 106, 115 (1948). 
183  See War Labor Disputes Act (Smith-Connally Act), ch. 144, 57 Stat. 167 (1943) (limiting the amount of 
money that can be contributed “in connection with any election”); Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 
Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (codified as amended within 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-166 (1947)). For a review of this history, 
see Automobile Workers, 352 U.S at 577-79 (describing the historical antecedents to the Labor Management Relations Act 
of 1947). 
184  See Cong. of Indus. Org., 335 U.S. 106.   
185  Id. at 108 (urging all members of the CIO to vote for Judge Ed Garmatz, then a candidate for Congress 
in Maryland at a special election to be held July 15, 1947). 
186  Id. at 108-09.  
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Supreme Court reasoned that, because there were no allegations of free distribution beyond union 
membership, the endorsement was unlikely to persuade anyone who did not already voluntarily 
affiliate with the union.
187
 Thus it found the CIO’s newsletter not to be an indirect contribution to 
the candidate.
188
 
Shortly thereafter, television came to occupy a central position in American life. 
Regularly scheduled broadcasts began in New York in 1938 and became widespread after the 
war.
189
 During the 1954 congressional elections, another union was indicted for making a 
candidate endorsement by paying “a specific amount from its general treasury fund to Luckoff 
and Wayburn Productions, Detroit, Michigan, to defray the costs of certain television broadcasts 
sponsored by the Union from commercial television station WJBK.”
190
 On appeal in United States 
v. International Union of United Automobile Workers (“UAW”), the Supreme Court compared 
this activity to the political corruption cases of the earlier part of the century, stating that “what is 
involved here is the integrity of our electoral process, and, not less, the responsibility of the 
individual citizen for the successful functioning of that process. This case thus raises issues not 
less than basic to a democratic society.”
191
 
Dissenting from that holding, Justice Douglas noted an inconsistency: 
The opinion of the Court places [the televised UAW broadcast] in the setting of 
corrupt practices. The opinion generates an environment of evildoing and points 
to the oppressions and misdeeds that have haunted elections in this country. 
Making a speech endorsing a candidate for office does not, however, deserve to 
be identified with antisocial conduct. Until today political speech has never 
been considered a crime.
192
 
To explain why Automobile Workers belonged in the setting of corrupt practices, the 
majority drew a distinction based on the technology used to disseminate the endorsement. Where 
the CIO had “merely distributed its house organ to its own people,”
193
 the UAW had “used union 
dues to sponsor commercial television broadcasts designed to influence the electorate to select 
                                                                
187  Id. at 111 (“We do not read the indictment as charging an expenditure by the CIO in circulating free 
copies to nonsubscribers, nonpurchasers or among citizens not entitled to receive copies of ‘The CIO News,’ as members 
of the union.”); but see id. at 131-32 (Rutledge, J., concurring in the result) (calling into question whether the newsletter 
was freely distributed).   
188  Id. at 123-24. Despite using statutory construction to avoid the constitutional issue, the majority of the 
Court nonetheless suggested, in dicta, that if the law were extended to publications like the CIO’s newsletter, “gravest 
doubt would arise in our minds as to its constitutionality.” Id. at 121. Five justices asserted that the indictment should be 
dismissed directly on this basis. Id. at 124-26 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 129-30 (Rutledge, J., concurring in the 
result, joined by Black, Douglas, & Murphy, JJ.). 
189  See Telecasts Here and Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1938, at 10 (providing the operating schedule for 
a television station in New York). 
190  United States v. UAW-CIO, 138 F. Supp. 53, 54 (E.D. Mich. 1956).  
191  Automobile Workers, 352 U.S at 570. 
192  Id. at 594 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
193  Id. at 589 (considering the decision of United States v. Cong. of Indus. Orgs., 335 U.S. 106 (1948)).   
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certain candidates for Congress.”
194
 Though this distinction highlighted the reach of mass 
media—the televised mass broadcast versus the printed in-house newsletter—the Court dismissed 
it as “an irrelevant difference in the medium of communication employed.”
195
 This illustrates the 
kind of “blackboxing” of reasoning about technology that we will see as the century goes on. 
Presaging what would become the majority opinion in Citizens United, dissenting Justice 
Douglas urged that all manner of speech are fungible in a marketplace of ideas, whether 
technologically mediated or not: 
It would make no difference under this construction of the [Corrupt Practices] 
Act whether the union spokesman made his address from the platform of a hall, 
used a sound truck in the streets, or bought time on radio or 
television . . . . [T]he size of the audience has heretofore been deemed wholly 
irrelevant to First Amendment issues.  One has a right to freedom of speech 
whether he talks to one person or to one thousand.
196
 
Yet these comments overlook concerns about persuasive new forms of mass media that 
began to emerge at end of the 1950s. In 1957, when Automobile Workers was decided, the 
average U.S. viewer watched approximately two hundred minutes of television daily, a fact that 
led then FCC chairman Newton Minow to declare television a “vast wasteland,” filled with 
“endless hours of mediocrity.”
197
 In 1971, networks transitioned from sixty- to thirty-second 
commercial segments, doubling the amount of advertising within programming and deepening 
their involvement with corporate sponsors. During the 1970s, network profits surpassed $7.5 
billion annually, while concern for public welfare relative to product sales led Congress to ban 
televised cigarette advertising, and to obtain networks’ agreement to reduce commercial time in 
children’s programming.
198
 
B. You Can’t Afford to Speak? You Have a Right to Listen 
Prior to the advent of cable, licensed television broadcasters were viewed as public 
                                                                
194  Id. at 585. 
195  Id. (comparing the televised UAW broadcast to a radio advertisement by the Brotherhood of Railway 
Trainmen and the printed newsletter distributed by the CIO); see also id. at 587 n.1 (quoting Senator Taft, sponsor of the 
expenditures ban: “I want to make the point that we are not raising any new questions here. Those same questions could 
have been raised with respect to corporations during the past 25 years. It is a question of fact: Was the corporation using 
its money to influence a political election?”).  
196  Id. at 594-95 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also id. at 593 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“It is . . . important—
vitally important—that all channels of communication be open . . . during every election . . . .”). 
197  Newton N. Minow, Chairman, FCC, Television and the Public Interest, Address Before the National 
Association of Broadcasters (May 9, 1961), http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/newtonminow.htm. Interestingly, 
Minow worked on the electoral campaign staff of Adlai Stevenson, who was also deeply skeptical about the merits of 
television. See Stevenson, supra note 160. Opinions varied, however; on the same day Minow made his “wasteland” 
comment, Vice President Hubert Humphrey described television as “the greatest single achievement in communication 
that anybody or any area of the world has ever known.” History of Television, supra note 165. 
198  Id.  
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trustees of a limited resource: the “airwaves.”
199
 Under this conception, Congress instituted the 
Fairness Doctrine in 1949, mandating that broadcasters allocate “reasonable opportunity for the 
discussion” of opposing viewpoints on public issues or risk revocation of their license to 
broadcast.
200
 
The Supreme Court upheld this regulation in Red Lion Broadcasting v. Federal 
Communication Commission, with three lines of reasoning tailored to television. First, it noted 
that “there are substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to 
allocate.”
201
 Then it described a “right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, 
esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences,” and identified as a “purpose of the First 
Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately 
prevail.”
202
 In 1974, the Court struck down a statute substantially similar to the Fairness Doctrine 
that required the provision of equal time in newspapers.
203
 It clarified that because newspapers are 
not “broadcast,” they do not raise the kind of technology-specific issues that legislatures have a 
compelling interest to address concerning television.
204
 
Like the marketplace of ideas, the listeners’ “right to receive” also became more 
prominent in the Supreme Court’s reasoning about the First Amendment as communications 
technology spread. In 1943, the Court held that the First Amendment “necessarily protects the 
right to receive” information.
205
 In 1969, it announced: “It is now well established that the 
Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas.”
206
 In 1976, it explained that “the 
protection afforded is to the communication, to its source and to its recipients both.”
207
 
Both of these conceptual tools were necessary for shifting the legal paradigm governing 
the constitutional protection of freedom of expression towards the inclusion of organizations. 
Once discourse is viewed as having been transformed by technology into a matter of bandwidth to 
which not everyone has access, producing a “marketplace of ideas” for those who must listen 
becomes essential. This reasoning features prominently in the holding in Citizens United.
208
 
                                                                
199  See Mark S. Fowler & Daniel L. Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX. L. 
REV. 207, 213-17 (1982) (discussing the origins of the concept of broadcasters as community trustees). 
200  The Fairness Doctrine was described at 47 C.F.R. § 73.1910 (1983), removed by Broadcast Applications 
and Proceedings, 76 Fed. Reg. 55,817 (Sept. 9, 2011). See generally Thomas G. Krattenmaker & L.A. Powe, Jr., The 
Fairness Doctrine Today: A Constitutional Curiosity and an Impossible Dream, 1985 DUKE L.J. 151 (1985); see also 
HUGH CARTER DONAHUE, THE BATTLE TO CONTROL BROADCAST NEWS: WHO OWNS THE FIRST AMENDMENT? 45 
(1989).   
201  Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388 (1969). 
202  Id. at 390 (emphasis added). 
203  Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 244, 258 (1974). 
204  See Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 200, at 156-57. In CBS v. FCC in 1981, the Court distinguished 
Red Lion and Tornillo by explaining that Red Lion had to do with “broadcasting.” Id.  
205  Martin, 319 U.S. at 143. 
206  Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564. 
207  Va. Bd. Of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976). 
208  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 354 (“Austin interferes with the ‘open marketplace’ of ideas protected by 
the First Amendment.”) (citing N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 208 (2008)). 
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Strikingly, this history of broadcast technology and its treatment in other sorts of cases (such as 
Fairness Doctrine ones) has not yet been read alongside the history of campaign finance reform; 
notably, it runs in parallel. 
C. Money-as-Speech in the “Marketplace of Ideas” 
The same year as networks transitioned from sixty to thirty-second advertising segments 
(greatly increasing the amount of advertising on television, and the financial power of 
broadcasters), Congress overhauled the campaign finance system with the Federal Election 
Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA).
209
 To create more transparency, it strengthened requirements for 
disclosure of contributions and expenditures by campaigns, parties, and outside groups.
210
 To 
address the high costs of campaigning, it established a public fund for national party nominees 
and presidential candidates who agreed to limit fundraising during the general election.
211
 
However, FECA failed to deter campaign finance abuses during the 1972 presidential 
contest between Richard Nixon and George McGovern, in which some of the largest U.S. 
corporations made illegal contributions.
212
 Congress therefore amended the law in 1974 and 
created a new regulatory agency, the Federal Election Commission, to enforce it.
213
 These 
amendments were challenged during the next presidential election. In a per curiam opinion of 
considerable length in Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court upheld FECA’s limits on campaign 
contributions but struck its expenditure limits as unconstitutional. In doing so it accepted the 
argument of Senator James Buckley, presidential candidate Eugene McCarthy, a number of 
political parties, political action committees, and a political newspaper, that monetary 
expenditures are at the very core of political speech, and that the Act’s limitations thus constitute 
restraints on First Amendment liberty.
214
 
Buckley is a particularly significant placeholder in the shifting of the First Amendment 
                                                                
209  Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (current version 
at 52 U.S.C.A. § 30101 (2002)).  
210  52 U.S.C.A. § 30120(a)(3), (d)(2) (originally enacted as FECA, 2 U.S.C. § 318) (requiring televised 
electioneering communications funded by anyone other than a candidate to include a disclaimer identifying the person or 
entity responsible for the content of the advertising); 11 C.F.R. § 100.29. The disclaimer requirement is the only piece of 
McCain-Feingold’s regulation of electioneering communication that survived Citizens United. 
211  See Presidential Election Campaign Fund (PECF), FED. ELECTION COMM’N, 
http://www.fec.gov/press/bkgnd/fund.shtml (last visited Jun. 13, 2015); Party nominees can access a public fund gathered 
from taxpayer contributions if they raise a minimum of $5,000 from individual donors in at least twenty states and agree to 
overall spending limits of $10 million plus an indexed inflation offset (in 2012, the limit was approximately $45 million). 
Id. Presidential candidates are eligible for $20 million in public funding if they agree to cease fundraising during the 
general election. Id.; see generally COSTAS PANAGOPOULOS, PUBLIC FINANCING IN AMERICAN ELECTIONS (2011) 
(discussing current issues in campaign finance practices). 
212  Ben A. Franklin, Inquiries Into Nixon’s Re-election Funds Turning Up a Pattern of High Pressure, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 15, 1973, at L35 (noting conviction of American Airlines for making illegal contributions to Nixon’s 
campaign); The Nation: Corporations Had a Lot to Spend on Campaigns, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1975, at E4 (eighteen 
corporations in total were convicted of violating the law). 
213  Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (codified as 
amended at 52 U.S.C.A § 30106). 
214  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 15, 19, 45. 
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paradigm to accommodate organizations, because it links reasoning about aggregated capital to 
the changes brought to communication by technologies of mass media. The Court therefore 
rejected the argument “that the dependence of a communication on the expenditure of money 
operates itself to introduce a nonspeech element or to reduce the exacting scrutiny required by the 
First Amendment,” and did so explicitly on grounds that using expensive technology had become 
an inevitable aspect of speaking to vast populations in a modern age: 
A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political 
communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of 
expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their 
exploration, and the size of the audience reached. This is because virtually 
every means of communicating ideas in today’s mass society requires the 
expenditure of money . . . . The electorate’s increasing dependence on 
television, radio, and other mass media for news and information has made 
these expensive modes of communication indispensable instruments of effective 
political speech.
215
 
Here again we see a technological imperative driving jurisprudence. The statement that 
“virtually every means of communicating ideas in today’s mass society requires the expenditure 
of money” suggests that high-cost political speech must be accepted because technology has 
irreversibly modified the way we receive information. Thus the Court quipped in Buckley that 
“[b]eing free to engage in unlimited political expression subject to a ceiling on expenditures is 
like being free to drive an automobile as far and as often as one desires on a single tank of 
gasoline.”
216
 Yet this underplays precisely the problem that Congress sought to address with 
FECA: that most people could not afford to “debate on public issues” at a cost of four thousand 
dollars per minute.
217
 Rather than allowing technology to simply ratchet up the cost of running for 
public office, Congress decided to publicly finance the presidential election and to limit 
expenditures in an attempt to diminish the importance of material wealth as a prerequisite to 
effective campaigning. Here we see two different views of technology—one legislative, one 
judicial—driving two different interpretations of whether governmental action is required vis-à-
vis capital expenditures, made mostly by corporations, in a high-cost environment for political 
communication. 
Finding instead that “restricting the voices of people and interest groups who have 
money to spend” impedes constitutionally protected expressive rights, Buckley equated the 
expenditure of money to speech.
218
 Thus, the Court reframed FECA as Congress’ choice of a 
redistributive versus laissez faire policy for political expression, describing its expenditure 
restrictions as attempting to equalize people and groups of different ex ante “financial ability to 
engage in public discussion”
219
 by “placing a ceiling on expenditures for political expression” ex 
                                                                
215  Id. at 16, 19 (footnote omitted). 
216  Id. at 19 n.18. 
217  Id. at 14 (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).  
218  Id. at 17, 19. 
219  Id. at 49. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2016
ROBINSON_SHIFTED PERSONHOOD_FORMATTED_FINALFINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/11/2016  10:03 AM 
432 UNIV. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE [Vol. 18.5 
post.
220
 Citizens United would adopt precisely this same framing, relying on Buckley to cast 
McCain-Feingold’s regulation of corporate and union “electioneering communication” as simply 
a regulation of the capital required to produce it.
221
 
After Buckley eliminated restrictions on their expenditures, outside groups increasingly 
functioned as the media arm of campaigns and parties, still subject to FECA’s contribution limits, 
during the 1980s.
222
 In 1984, an organization called the National Conservative Political Action 
Committee (“NCPAC”) produced a widely viewed advertisement called “Morning in America,” 
extolling the incumbent Reagan’s contributions to U.S. prosperity and strength during the 
Reagan-Mondale presidential contest.
223
 The Democratic National Committee (“DNC”) charged 
that NCPAC had expended money on this ad as candidate advocacy, in violation of the public 
financing scheme established by FECA, which made it a criminal offense to spend more than 
$1,000 to further the election of a candidate who had already chosen to receive public 
financing.
224
 Relying on Buckley, the Supreme Court affirmed in Federal Election Commission v. 
NCPAC that outside group expenditures “produce speech at the core of the First Amendment.”
225
 
As long NCPAC’s expenditures on “Morning in America” were “uncoordinated with the 
candidate or his campaign,” the Court found “no tendency” for corruption or the appearance of 
corruption, which were the “only legitimate and compelling interests thus far identified for 
restricting campaign finances.”
226
 
NCPAC is significant because, as Buckley had collapsed the distinction between money 
and speech, it collapsed the difference between speakers and listeners. It did this by reading 
together the constitutional concept of freedom of association with the concept of freedom of 
expression. The Court described PACs as “mechanisms” by which “large numbers of individuals 
of modest means can join together in organizations that serve to ‘amplif[y] the voice of their 
adherents.’”
227
 However, as the dissent pointed out, the donation of money does not transform 
contributors into speakers; it transforms the recipient organization into one.
228
 NCPAC’s majority 
                                                                
220  Id. at 17. 
221  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 350 (2010) (“Buckley rejected the premise that the Government has an 
interest ‘in equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections.’”) (quoting 
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48).  
222  See KENNETH M. GOLDSTEIN, INTEREST GROUPS, LOBBYING, AND PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA 24, 125 
(1999). 
223  Ronald Reagan It’s Morning In America 1984, YOUTUBE, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fa8Qupc4PnQ (last visited Jun. 13, 2015). 
224  FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 482-83 (1985) [hereinafter NCPAC]. 
The Democratic National Committee’s standing to make a claim against NCPAC on that basis was disputed, however the 
Federal Election Commission, a regulator clearly empowered by Congress to enforce the statute, joined the suit. Id. at 489-
90. 
225  NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 493. 
226  Id. at 496-97; but see id. at 511 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, J. & Brennan, J.) (noting a 
pattern of “significant contacts between an organization like NCPAC and candidates for, and holders of, public office,” 
including the exchange of personnel). 
227  Id. at 494 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 22).   
228  Id. at 512-13 (White, J., dissenting)  
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equivocated by reasoning that individual “contributors obviously like the message they are 
hearing from these organizations and want to add their voices to that message; otherwise they 
would not part with their money.”
229
 Yet contributors have no control over a PAC’s messaging; if 
they do not like what they hear, they have no recourse other than to withhold funding for its future 
speech. 
Despite this hazy logic, NCPAC’s “associational” theory of political speech was a logical 
outgrowth of Buckley’s recognition that television and other mass media had made the 
expenditure of large sums of money an “essential ingredient” of contemporary political 
advocacy.
230
 The next step was to note that, in a “marketplace of ideas” mediated through 
expensive technologies, individuals were no longer the primary discursive units of the body 
politic because they could not afford to be. NCPAC noted exactly this: “The PACs in this case, of 
course, are not lone pamphleteers or street corner orators in the Tom Paine mold; they spend 
substantial amounts of money in order to communicate their political ideas through sophisticated 
media advertisements.”
231
 
In 1986, the Supreme Court made a clearer articulation of the premise behind its ruling 
in NCPAC by describing listener contributions as a “market signal” of support for the 
organization’s ideas.
232
 It therefore seemed to reach the same conclusion about contemporary 
public discourse as media theorist Tarleton Gillespie: “The means by which we produce, 
circulate, and consume information in a complex society must necessarily be handled through the 
division of labor: some produce and select information, and the rest of us, at least in that moment, 
can only take it for what it’s worth.”
233
 We can see in this comment the relevance of all of the key 
concepts that the Supreme Court developed to accommodate technologically-mediated mass 
communication within its First Amendment jurisprudence during the second half of the twentieth 
century: particularly, the listener’s right to receive information in a marketplace of ideas 
(“consume information”), and the right of organizations to spend unlimited amounts to produce 
that marketplace (“circulate information”). Under this rubric, consumption of a PACs’ ideas by 
                                                                
The majority never explicitly identifies whose First Amendment interests it believes it is protecting. 
However, its concern for rights of association and the effective political speech of those of modest 
means . . . indicates that it is concerned with the interests of the PACs’ contributors. But the 
‘contributors’ are exactly that—contributors, rather than speakers . . . . Even if spending money is to 
be considered speech, I fail to see how giving money to an independent organization to use as it 
wishes is also speech . . . . [A]ppellees are not simply mouthpieces for their individual contributors. 
Id.  
229  Id. at 495. Professor Batchis points to the same equivocation in Citizens United. Wayne Batchis, 
Citizens United and the Paradox of “Corporate Speech”: From Freedom of Association to Freedom of the Association, 36 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 5, 8-9 (2012). 
230  Further, as a more academic and historical then doctrinal matter, it is worth noting that NCPAC’s link 
between freedom of association and freedom of speech expresses a version of “group theory” of the kind that legal 
thinkers in the United States and Europe were struggling to develop during the later nineteenth century. See HORWITZ, 
supra note 9, at 185.  
231  NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 493.   
232  FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 258 (1986). 
233  Tarleton Gillespie, The Relevance of Algorithms, in MEDIA TECHNOLOGIES: ESSAYS ON 
COMMUNICATION, MATERIALITY, AND SOCIETY 191 (Tarleton Gillespie, Pablo J. Boczkowski, & Kirsten A. Foot, eds., 
2014). 
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contributing money to it serves as a “market signal” of support that becomes the twentieth-century 
constitutional equivalent to speaking itself. 
Consequently, by the late 1970s the Supreme Court had determined that high-cost, 
technologically-mediated mass media constituted a new normal with which the First Amendment 
must catch up or, as it said per curiam in Buckley, risk “reduc[ing] the quantity of 
expression . . . the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the 
audience reached.”
234
 The Court concurrently portrayed these circumstances as non-novel, 
because “[t]he distribution of the humblest handbill or leaflet” also entails costs.
235
 Thus the Court 
elided an assertion that technology was constitutionally neutral and an assertion that it was a 
maximizing factor in democratic discourse, measured quantitatively. Importantly, this allowed the 
Court to be both technologically deterministic in its reasoning—”we must adapt the First 
Amendment to mass media because it has already changed public discourse”—and 
technologically optimistic—”in any case, it’s a good thing and not unlike anything that has come 
before.” We will see these typologies again in Citizens United. 
III. ANTIDISTORTION MEETS THE TECHNOLOGICAL IMPERATIVE 
After Buckley, influential television ads produced by outside organizations continued to 
figure prominently in U.S. elections during the 1980s and 1990s. In 1988, an ad known as “Willie 
Horton” juxtaposed the image of a convicted felon with that of the Democratic presidential 
nominee Michael Dukakis, above the text “Kidnapping, Stabbing, Raping.”
236
 The ad was 
produced by a Republican organization known as the National Security PAC to associate 
Dukakis’ governorship in Massachusetts with the story of Horton, who committed the listed 
crimes while granted weekend furlough from a life sentence in the state. During the 1990s, 
outside organizations spent heavily on behalf of the Democrats; labor unions, for example, spent 
$2.7 million on media communication in support of Bill Clinton during his 1996 presidential race 
against Bob Dole.
237
 
The next overhaul of electoral regulation was clearly the product of weariness on the part 
of both parties with these “ad wars.” In debate over the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 
legislators described the ads as “poison politics,” “air pollution,” “drive by shootings,” “crack 
cocaine,” “brutal,” and “a nightmare.”
238
 Sponsored by Democrat Russ Feingold and Republican 
                                                                
234  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19. 
235  Id. 
236  Llehman84, Willie Horton 1988 Attack Ad, YOUTUBE (Nov. 3, 2008) 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Io9KMSSEZ0Y. 
237  See David E. Rosenbaum, In Political Money Game, the Year of Big Loopholes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 
1996, at A1; Anthony Corrado, Financing the 1996 Presidential General Election, in FINANCING THE 1996 ELECTION 63, 
83 (John C. Green ed., 1999). 
238  144 Cong. Rec. 1601 (1998) (statement of Sen. Daschle) (analogizing attack ads to “crack cocaine”); id. 
at 1613 (statement of Sen. Durbin) (describing them as “drive by shooting[s]”); 145 Cong. Rec. 20505 (1997) (statement 
of Sen. Dorgan) (describing them as “air pollution”); id. at 2051-52 (statement of Sen. McCain) (describing “how to raise 
the tenor of the debate in our elections and give people real choices”); 145 Cong. Rec. 20746 (1997) (statement of Sen. 
Boxer) (“They directly attack candidates without any accountability. It is brutal . . . . We have an opportunity in the 
McCain-Feingold bill to stop that . . . .”); 145 Cong. Rec. S12606-S12607 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1999) (statement of Sen. 
Wellstone) (“I think these issue advocacy ads are a nightmare. I think all of us should hate them . . . . [By passing the 
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John McCain, the new law aimed directly at minimizing the ads by barring corporate and union-
funded “electioneering communication” distributed by broadcast, cable, or satellite transmissions 
that could be received by 50,000 or more persons during periods shortly before primary and 
general elections.
239
 
A. One of these Things is not Like the Others: Austin, McConnell, and Citizens United 
A year after it was enacted, McCain-Feingold was challenged in McConnell v. Federal 
Election Commission.
240
 In a 5-4 decision announced in an opinion of over one hundred pages, the 
Supreme Court upheld the law as furthering the government’s interest in counteracting the 
“‘corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth . . . accumulated with the 
help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public’s support for the 
corporation’s political ideas.’”
241
 McConnell’s majority cited a legislative record of $135 to $150 
million in spending by outside organizations on televised “issue” advertisements during the 1996 
electoral cycle, followed by $270 to $340 million during the mid-term election of 1998, and 
exceeding $500 million during the presidential election of 2000, which featured over one 
thousand different issue advertisements.
242
 The Court noted that “[c]orporations and unions spent 
hundreds of millions of dollars of their general funds” to produce these ads, which were 
“specifically intended to affect election results . . . confirmed by the fact that almost all of them 
aired in the 60 days immediately preceding a federal election.”
243
 
Congress, the Court found, was not only concerned by the close nexus between 
corporations and unions and political parties and candidates, but by the power of television to 
effectively mask those connections. McConnell’s majority cited a legislative record indicating that 
candidates had been able “to work closely with friendly interest groups to sponsor so-called issue 
ads when the candidates themselves were running out of money,” while using “misleading names 
to conceal their identity.”
244
 Citizens for Better Medicare, for example, was “not a grassroots 
organization of citizens, as its name might suggest, but was instead a platform for an association 
of drug manufacturers.”
245
 
Both the majority and dissenting justices in McConnell therefore identified the public 
policy issue addressed by McCain-Feingold as a technology management question. The law did 
                                                                
legislation, we] could get some of this poison politics off television”); 148 Cong. Rec. S2117 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2002) 
(statement of Sen. Cantwell) (“This bill is about slowing the ad war . . . and making sure the flow of negative ads by 
outside interest groups does not continue to permeate the airwaves.”). 
239  Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA, McCain-Feingold Act), Pub L. No. 107-155, 116 
Stat. 81 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 432); 11 C.F.R. § 100.29(1)(2), (b)(3)(ii) (2009). 
240  McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled by Citizens United, 558 U.S.. 
241  Id. at 274-75 (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990)).  
242  Id. at 127 n.20.  
243  Id. at 127.  
244  Id. at 128.  
245  Id. For more recent examples, see Fredreka Schouten, Christopher Schnarrs & Gregory Korte, Naming 
names behind slew of super PAC ads, USA TODAY (Feb. 1, 2012, 10:03 AM), 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/politics/story/2012-01-31/super-pacs-campaign-finance-reports/52907890/1. 
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“not apply to advertising in the print media or on the Internet,” the majority pointed out, but to the 
“virtual torrent of televised election-related ads during the periods immediately preceding federal 
elections.”
246
 Justice Scalia, dissenting, also referred to the legislative record: “[L]et us not be 
deceived. While the Government’s briefs and arguments before this court focused on the horrible 
‘appearance of corruption,’ the most passionate floor statements during the debates on this 
legislation pertained to so-called attack ads . . . .”
247
 
McConnell identified the governmental interests advanced McCain-Feingold’s regulation 
of mass-broadcast “electioneering communication” as both an interest in “anticorruption” and an 
interest in “antidistortion.”
248
 The latter was introduced by the 1990 case of Michigan Chamber of 
Commerce v. Austin.
249
 Austin upheld the Michigan Campaign Finance Act, which, similar to 
FECA, prohibited corporations from using their general treasury funds to make independent 
expenditures on behalf of candidates for state office.
250
 Michigan argued that corporations receive 
“special advantages—such as limited liability, perpetual life, and favorable treatment of the 
accumulation and distribution of assets—that enhance their ability to attract capital” and “present 
the potential for distorting the political process,” because the capital accumulation has “little or no 
correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.”
251
 The Supreme Court 
found Michigan’s interest in preventing this “distortion” sufficiently different from the interest in 
preventing corruption that it found inadequate to justify a similar ban on expenditures in 
Buckley.
252
 McConnell’s majority extended this reasoning to McCain-Feingold’s regulation of 
corporate- and union-funded mass-broadcast “electioneering communication.”
253
 
Both Austin and McConnell were challenged when a nonprofit organization called 
“Citizens United” sought to release what it described as a “documentary film” critical of 
candidate Hillary Clinton on cable television within thirty days of the Democratic primary for the 
presidential election.
254
 The organization preemptively challenged McCain-Feingold’s prohibited 
period for “electioneering communication” as abridging its right to freedom of speech protected 
by the First Amendment.
255
 In yet another 5-4 decision of considerable length in Citizens United 
v. Federal Election Commission, the Supreme Court determined that the film was indeed an 
“electioneering communication” on the basis of its thesis that Senator Clinton was unfit for the 
presidency, but found regulation of such communication to violate the free speech protections of 
                                                                
246  McConnell, 540 U.S. at 207. 
247  Id. at 260 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
248  Id. at 136, 167-70, 205 (discussing the “distorting effect” of ads).  
249  Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990).   
250  Id. at 654. 
251  Id. at 658-59, 661-62. 
252  Id. at 659-60, 666 (describing “the State’s decision to regulate only corporations [as] precisely tailored 
to serve the compelling state interest of eliminating from the political process the corrosive effect of political ‘war chests’ 
amassed with the aid of the legal advantages given to corporations.”). 
253  McConnell, 540 U.S. at 205 (citing Austin, 494 U.S. 652 at 660).  
254  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 310, 319. 
255  Citizens United, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 277. 
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the First Amendment.
256
 Reversing both McConnell and Austin, the majority relied on Buckley, 
quoting from that case to describe McCain-Feingold as “necessarily reduc[ing] the quantity of 
expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the 
size of the audience reached.”
257
 The law therefore harmed “society as a whole, which is deprived 
of an uninhibited marketplace of ideas.”
258
 
As we have seen, the “marketplace of ideas” migrated from the dissenting periphery to 
the majority center of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the First Amendment’s core values, 
parallel to the rise of television in American life.
259
 Conceptually, it made room within the 
amendment for valuing not only freedoms of speech and of the press, but for preserving a wide 
spectrum of ideas for listeners to hear, and for viewing listeners’ financial contributions to 
organizations as equivalent to the exercise of either freedom of speech (Buckley) or freedom of 
speech-qua-association (NCPAC). This allowed the Court to accommodate within its traditional 
First Amendment protection a political conversation dominated by expensive mass media, in 
which most individuals could not afford to participate as anything other than listeners. Using 
these concepts, Citizens United reframed the political “ad war” as a phenomenon not only 
beneficial but necessary to create a “marketplace of ideas” in contemporary American politics. 
This view replaced an extensive legislative history, barely mentioned in Citizens United, in which 
Congress found televised ads distortive of American politics.
260
 
Under its optimistic view of television, Citizens United’s majority would characterize 
McCain-Feingold’s regulation of corporate and union-funded mass broadcast electioneering 
communication as “analogous to licensing laws implemented in 16th- and 17th-century England,” 
and permitting the FEC to do nothing less than “use censorship to control thought.”
261
 “[T]he 
most important means of mass communication in modern times,” the majority asserted in Citizens 
United, to the contrary carried a constitutional imperative: “The First Amendment was certainly 
not understood to condone the suppression of political speech in society’s most salient media.”
262
 
The Court’s obligation, like Congress’, was to step aside: “We must decline to draw, and then re-
draw, constitutional lines based on the particular media or technology used to disseminate 
                                                                
256  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 324, 368. 
257  Id. at 339 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19). 
258  Id. at 335 (quoting Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003)).  
259  Compare Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (stating “the 
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas . . . the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the 
competition of the market”), with Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390 (asserting “the purpose of the First Amendment [is] to 
preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail”), Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 
257 (noting “the wisdom of Justice Holmes’ observation that the ‘ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in 
ideas’”), and Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 354 (declaring “Austin interferes with the ‘open marketplace’ of ideas protected 
by the First Amendment.”). 
260  Compare McConnell, 540 U.S. at 127 (quoting extensively legislators’ negative remarks about televised 
ads), with Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 353 (describing television as “society’s most salient media” and one of “the most 
important means of communication in modern times”). 
261  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 335, 356 (describing McCain-Feingold as requiring corporations and unions 
to “ask a governmental agency for prior permission to speak”). 
262  Id. at 353 (stating “television networks and major newspapers owned by media corporations have 
become the most important means of mass communication in modern times.”). 
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political speech from a particular speaker.”
263
 This was because “[r]apid changes in technology—
and the creative dynamic inherent in the concept of free expression—counsel against upholding a 
law that restricts political speech in certain media or by certain speakers.”
264
 
This kind of reasoning suggests that the “concept of free expression” and “rapid changes 
in technology” are borne from the same source: from a “creative dynamic” inherent in the First 
Amendment. Yet it is the Court’s own technologically-optimistic interpretation of these 
technologies as facilitating citizens’ “freedom to experiment and create in the realm of thought 
and speech,” that is driving this conclusion.
265
 As in Buckley, the logic is technologically 
deterministic: it allows what is technologically possible to draw the line for what is 
constitutionally permissible. Congress cannot impose a quiet period prior to elections on 
“electioneering communications” funded by corporations and unions because “society as a 
whole” will be “deprived of an uninhibited marketplace of ideas.”
266
 This calibrates the 
protections of the First Amendment to judges’ normative assessment of a society they perceive to 
be reliant on technology to generate political discourse. As Justice Stevens noted in dissent in 
Citizens United, this generates a technological change-driven jurisprudence “in which novel First 
Amendment standards must be devised on an ad hoc basis . . . .”
267
 
Thus we can view Citizens United as a kind of Lochner for the Information Age: it 
exhibits the same kind of hubris regarding legislative management of technologies of mass 
communication that Lochner exhibited regarding legislative management of the economy.
268
 Its 
majority portrayed McCain-Feingold’s regulation of the “ad wars” as heavy-handed Luddism 
against a creative and technologically adept citizenry. This view depends on overlooking an 
imbalance in power between organizations and individuals in a mass media-dominated 
“marketplace of ideas,” just as Lochner depended heavily on optimistic views of laissez faire 
capitalism that overlook a similar power imbalance in the labor market.
269
 
Like Lochner’s majority, Citizens United’s majority portrayed Congress’ regulation of 
“electioneering communication” as an attempt to reorder economic relationships already justly 
                                                                
263  Id. at 326. 
264  Id. at 364.  
265  Id. at 372 (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 341) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also id. 
(“Citizens must be free to use new forms, and new forums, for the expression of ideas.”) (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 
341) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
266  Id. at 335 (quoting Hicks, 539 U.S. at 119 (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
267  Id. at 400 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
268  This idea owes its provenance to Professor David Super, who commented about the similarity of my 
argument to Justice Holmes’ dissent in Lochner during a summer faculty colloquium at Georgetown University Law 
Center, where I presented early versions of this work consequent to a visiting researcher affiliation during 2012-13. For 
that I would like to thank Gregory Klass, Julie O’Sullivan, and Dr. Eric L. Motley.  
269  See EDWARD S. HERMAN & NOAM CHOMSKY, MANUFACTURING CONSENT: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY 
OF THE MASS MEDIA 2 (1988) (describing “huge inequality in command of resources, and its effect . . . on access to a 
private media system”); Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (reasoning “[t]his case is decided upon an 
economic theory which a large part of this country does not entertain. If it were a question whether I agreed with that 
theory, I should desire to study it further and long before making up my mind. But I do not conceive that to be my duty 
because I strongly believe that my agreement or disagreement has nothing to do with the right of a majority to embody 
their opinions in law.”). 
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determined by the flow of capital. However, this portrayal was only possible because its reliance 
on Buckley allowed it to misconstrue McCain-Feingold as equivalent to a direct regulation of 
expenditures, and therefore failed to properly distinguish Austin and McConnell. Yet one of these 
things is not like the others: McCain-Feingold’s ban applied only to corporations and unions using 
their general treasuries to make “electioneering communication” with the ability to reach fifty 
thousand people or more during periods proximate to elections; Austin involved a regulation of 
expenditures, comparable to FECA, sustained based on arguments about the distortive effects on 
elections of corporate “war chests.” McConnell, in contrast, upheld McCain-Feingold as a 
regulation “of . . . expression,” citing a legislative record heavily focused on televised ads and 
correctly identifying the law as a regulation of the technological means of expression, not only the 
capital used to access it.
270
 
Failing to analytically distinguish Austin and McConnell based on the object of their 
regulations explains why government lawyers ultimately abandoned arguments based on 
“antidistortion” in Citizens United.
271
 Once it was clear that the Court would rely on Buckley, 
then-Solicitor General Elena Kagan disclaimed any reliance on antidistortion in relation to Austin, 
and did not distinguish McConnell on the basis that it concerned a regulation of technologies of 
mass broadcast “electioneering communication.”
272
 This was a missed opportunity to extend the 
“antidistortion interest” to McCain-Feingold, whose legislative history so clearly showed 
Congress’ concern with “distortion” of the electoral process by the “ad wars” produced by 
technologies of mass media and those who could afford to use them.
273
 
“Shifted personhood” is the new paradigm for freedom of expression because Citizens 
United rested its ultimate conclusion not on the many statements the Court made about mass 
media, but on a statement about the suppression of political speech based on the speaker’s 
identity.
274
 The majority described McCain-Feingold as a “categorical distinction[] based on the 
corporate identity of the speaker” that targeted “certain disfavored associations of citizens—those 
that have taken on the corporate form.”
275
 It recast the entire jurisprudential history of legislative 
attempts to reform the electoral system within this frame as simply “conflicting lines of precedent: 
a pre-Austin line that forbids restrictions on political speech based on the speaker’s corporate 
identity and a post-Austin line that permits them.”
276
 Framed thusly, the law was easy to strike 
                                                                
270  McConnell, 540 U.S. at 204.   
271  For an explanation not related to technology see generally Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the 
Orphaned Antidistortion Rationale, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 989 (2010). 
272  Transcript of Oral Argument at 47-48, Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 (No. 08-205) (asserting “where we 
talk about the distortion of the electoral process that occurs when corporations use their shareholders’ money who may or 
may not agree . . . [w]e do not rely at all on Austin to the extent that anybody takes Austin to be suggesting anything about 
the equalization of a speech market.”).   
273  See 144 Cong. Rec. 1601 (1998). 
274  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 346 (“[T]he Government cannot restrict political speech based on the 
speaker’s corporate identity.”), (citing Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765). Bellotti struck down a Massachusetts law prohibiting 
corporations from spending money to advocate during referenda on public questions that did not concern the corporation’s 
property, business, or assets. See generally Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). McConnell distinguished the regulation at issue 
in Bellotti from McCain-Feingold’s regulation of “electioneering communications.” See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 206 n.88.  
275  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 364, 356. 
276  Id. at 348. 
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down: 
If the First Amendment has any force, it prohibits Congress from fining or 
jailing citizens . . . for simply engaging in political speech.  If the antidistortion 
rationale were to be accepted, however, it would permit Government to ban 
political speech simply because the speaker is an association that has taken on 
the corporate form.
277
 
This placed the Court’s reasoning, including its reasoning about technology, squarely 
within the frame of a traditionally understood justification for the Court’s existence as a 
countermajoritarian institution: to protect unpopular political minorities.
278
 Incorporation here 
appears as simply a phase change of one kind of entity, “citizen,” into an organizational form 
better suited to doing things in a modern society—for example, one needs to use the mass media 
to communicate to the mass public. While this significantly downplays the resources involved in 
taking on the corporate form, and the real differences between organizations and actual members 
of the body politic, it reflects the strong position that organizations have already obtained in 
society at large within First Amendment jurisprudence. 
B. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Virginia Pharmacy 
The majority’s comments in Citizens United about television as society’s “most salient 
media” highlight the significance of technological optimism concerning mass media in the case 
decision. As this section will explore, we can provisionally associate this optimism with the death 
of Chief Justice Rehnquist in 2005. This connection helps explain the Court’s abrupt about-face 
concerning the constitutionality of McCain-Feingold in the short span between McConnell in 
2003 and Citizens United in 2010. While verifying this conclusion requires deeper treatment of 
First Amendment jurisprudence than there is space for here, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 1976 
dissent in Virginia Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Counsel will suffice.
279
 
The Virginia Pharmacy dissent suggests Justice Rehnquist’s deep skepticism regarding 
technologies of mass media.
280
 Decided the same year as Buckley v. Valeo, the Court in Virginia 
Pharmacy struck down a state law that sanctioned pharmacists for unprofessional conduct if they 
advertised prices directly to consumers.
281
 Dissenting from the holding, the Chief Justice was the 
                                                                
277  Id. at 349; see also id. at 392 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[A] corporation . . . cannot be denied the right to 
speak on the simplistic ground that it is not ‘an individual American.’”). 
278  See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF 
POLITICS 16-33 (2d. ed. 1986); but see Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the 
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 158 (2002) (“[I]t is in this disjuncture between public 
opinion and academic concern that we can see the countermajoritarian problem for what it is—an obsession that grips the 
academy even when it fails to describe reality.”). 
279  Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 781-90 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).   
280  See id. I am certainly not the first to note Chief Justice Rehnquist’s significant divergence from the other 
conservative members of the Court regarding corporate free speech. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Corporations and Free 
Speech, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 253, 254 (David Kairys ed., 1982).   
281  Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770.  
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only member of the Court to mention television.
282
 He described its potentially distortive effects 
on patients’ perception of complex issues related to medication, and argued that “[t]he very real 
dangers that general advertising for such drugs might create in terms of encouraging, even though 
not sanctioning, illicit use of them by individuals for whom they have not been prescribed . . . are 
simply not dealt with in the Court’s opinion.”
283
 He likened a pharmaceutical price regulation to 
legislative regulation of liquor and cigarette advertising already found constitutional: “Nothing we 
know about the acquisitive instincts of those who inhabit every business and profession . . . gives 
any reason to think that such persons will not do everything they can to generate demand for these 
products in much the same manner and to much the same degree as demand for other 
commodities has been generated.”
284
 
We can see from these comments how Chief Justice Rehnquist’s interpretation of the 
constitutional scope of protection for freedom of expression was in at least one instance 
underwritten by his skepticism about the technology of television and about the “acquisitive 
instincts” of organizations.
285
  His concerns, in fact, are strikingly similar to those that led 
Congress to enact McCain-Feingold, whose regulation of corporate and union “electioneering 
communication” Justice Rehnquist would vote to uphold in McConnell.
286
 Like Congress in that 
piece of legislation, Justice Rehnquist distinguished in Virginia Pharmacy between different types 
of communication, noting that “the challenged statute does not prohibit anyone from receiving . . . 
information [about pharmaceutical prices] either in person or by phone.”
287
 
                                                                
282  Id. at 789 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
283  Id. at 788-89 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Rehnquist gave examples of the kind of advertisements he 
predicted the holding would generate: 
“Pain getting you down? Insist that your physician prescribe Demerol.  You pay a little more than 
for aspirin, but you get a lot more relief.”  
“Can’t shake the flu? Get a prescription for Tetracycline from your doctor today.” 
“Don’t spend another sleepless night. Ask your doctor to prescribe Seconal without delay.” Id. at 
788.  
 
Id. at 788 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  
       Pharmaceutical companies have aired advertisements that are strikingly similar to those predicted above. 
See, e.g., Zoloft, Original Zoloft Commercial, YOUTUBE (Mar. 12, 2009), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=twhvtzd6gXA (last visited Jun. 13, 2015).   
284  Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 789 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). For an example of the Court’s jurisprudence 
surrounding regulation of liquor advertising, see, e.g., Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996).  
285  Id. at 789. We can perhaps better understand Justice Rehnquist’s skepticism about pharmaceutical 
advertising given the posthumous revelation that he was addicted to a prescription sleeping aid. See Pete Yost, Rehnquist 
Drug Dependency Detailed, WASH. POST, (Jan. 5, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/01/05/AR2007010500521.html. 
286  McConnell, 540 U.S. at 110 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), overruled in part by Citizens United, 558 U.S. 
310 (overruling portions of McCain-Feingold except for those concerning the regulation of “electioneering 
communication”). 
287  Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 782 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (discussing the pharmaceutical consumer’s 
“right to receive information” in the context of standing, and noting that not all avenues to receive information had been 
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There was little change in the ideological orientation of the justices who came to replace 
their predecessors during the period between McConnell and Citizens United; however, after 
Chief Justice Rehnquist died between the two decisions, John Roberts replaced him at fifty years 
old, having lived his entire life in the era of television.
288
 Chief Justice Roberts joined with the 
majority in Citizens United, finding McCain-Feingold unconstitutional under the optimistic view 
of television that Justice Kennedy articulated in the majority opinion. 
C. Deepening the Antidistortion Interest 
[W]here is it written that someone who is good on television is necessarily also 
a good politician? 
Václav Havel, Former President of Czechoslovakia
289
 
Between Automobile Workers and Citizens United, the Supreme Court grounded its 
increasingly permissive approach to the involvement of non-party organizations in U.S. politics in 
a technologically optimistic theory about the ability of such organizations to make the most 
effective use of modern communications technologies to generate a “marketplace of ideas.”
290
 
The Court suggested that, without organizational speech, public debate would stall, and it 
predicted that other emergent forms of communication, such as web-based social media, would 
eventually allow individuals to compete with organizational speakers.
291
 Relying on these points 
of view, the Court rejected concerns voiced by the people’s elected representatives in Congress 
about the distortive effects of specific kinds of mass media and specific kinds of organizations on 
the democratic process.
292
 
The “antidistortion interest” that was abandoned in Citizens United can be deepened by 
using social theory to gain a richer understanding of the interactions between the material, 
informational, and subjective inputs that influence voters during elections. This is a novel but not 
unprecedented approach to legal scholarship.
293
 It refers to a body of knowledge overlooked by 
                                                                
foreclosed).  
288  In 2005, John Roberts (in the majority in Citizens United majority) was appointed by George H.W. Bush 
to replace William Rehnquist (in the McConnell majority regarding McCain-Feingold Title II); in 2006, Samuel Alito (in 
the majority in Citizens United majority) was appointed by George H.W. Bush to replace Sandra Day O’Connor (in the 
majority in McConnell); in 2009, Sonia Sotomayor (in the dissent in Citizens United) was appointed by President Barack 
Obama to replace David Souter (in the majority in McConnell). See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 110, Citizens United, 558 U.S. 
at 316. Justices Thomas, Scalia, and Kennedy were in the dissent in McConnell regarding Title II of McCain-Feingold, 
maintaining that opinion in the majority in Citizens United. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 110-11; Citizens United, 558 U.S. 
at 316. 
289  Vaclav Havel, Former President of Czechoslovakia, Commencement Address at Harvard University 
(May 12, 1995) (transcript available at http://www.humanity.org/voices/commencements/vaclav-havel-harvard-university-
speech-1995). 
290  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 335. 
291  Id. at 364 (“Soon, however, it may be that Internet sources, such as blogs and social networking Web 
sites, will provide citizens with significant information about political candidates and issues.”).   
292  See id. at 349-60. 
293  See generally STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND (Univ. of Chi. 
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the Supreme Court as it crafted its own theory about the interaction between mass media and 
democratic discourse, one heavily leavened with technological optimism and technological 
determinism, and then ascribed that theory to the Constitution itself. 
The primary way we differ from the organizations we create can be labeled “psyche,” 
“self,” and “soul,” depending on the discourse. Here, I use the term “consciousness,” following 
philosopher Daniel N. Robinson and Nobel Prize-winning neurophysiologist Sir John C. Eccles, 
who found consciousness to be personhood’s most distinctive trait.
294
 Consciousness remains a 
scientific mystery, and to animate it in artificial intelligence is one of the great projects of our 
time.
295
 The philosopher René Descartes reasoned that consciousness constitutes more than the 
physical mechanics that take place in the brain, and contemporary scientists continue to make this 
assertion.
296
 Anesthesiologists can significantly alter consciousness but cannot explain the 
mechanism by which brain physiology produces it.
297
 Evolutionary biologists cannot explain its 
existence without a discrete physical aspect that could have been subject to selective evolution.
298
 
The American social compact was formed to protect “life, liberty, and property,”
299
 
which have material qualities, yet are qualitatively more when possessed in the context of 
conscious self-awareness. As Justice Brandeis articulated in Olmstead v. United States: 
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the 
pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man’s spiritual nature, 
of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, 
pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things.
300
 
Thus the Supreme Court has found that the First Amendment protects speech irrespective 
of whether it has material worth as truthful information, because it seeks to promote a society that 
has self-expressive individuals, regardless of the merit of what they articulate.
301
 Similarly, the 
Court has found that the Fourth Amendment protects against unlawful searches and seizures 
because to invade privacy has not only material consequences, but is also an affront to what 
                                                                
Press 2001) (using philosophy, anthropology, linguistics, and literary theory to understand how legal actors reason and 
decide). 
294  SIR JOHN ECCLES & DANIEL N. ROBINSON, THE WONDER OF BEING HUMAN: OUR BRAIN & OUR MIND 
25-26 (1984).   
295  See, e.g., A. M. Turing, Computing Machinery and Intelligence, 59 MIND 433, 433 (1950) (asking the 
rhetorical question of whether machines can think).  
296  See, e.g., S. Zeki, The Disunity of Consciousness, 7 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 214 (2003). 
297  Stuart R. Hameroff, The Entwined Mysteries of Anesthesia and Consciousness, 105 ANESTHESIOLOGY 
400 (2006) (“Unlike other receptor-mediated pharmacologic targets, consciousness is ill-defined, [and] cannot be 
measured . . . .”). 
298  Alexander Marshack, Some Implications of the Paleolithic Symbolic Evidence for the Origin of 
Language, 280 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 289, 310 (1976). 
299  U.S. CONST. pmbl. (1787).  
300  Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  
301  But see, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36 (1961) (recognizing there is no absolute 
protection for factual communications that cause private injury). 
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Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis referred to as the “inviolability of personality.”
302
 Thus, it is 
not only because of the material harm done to women’s bodily autonomy posed by restrictions on 
contraception that they are unconstitutional, but also because of the subjective harm done to 
women’s sense of privacy over reproductive decision-making.
303
 
To further the idea that human consciousness is central to systems of law, we can use 
philosopher Karl R. Popper’s description of three worlds of human experience.
304
 Popper 
distinguishes three worlds: (I) a world of physical objects and states that is the objective reality 
we physically experience, (II) a world of subjective interpretation that hinges upon consciousness, 
and (III) a world of knowledge and information that is transferable (Figure 1): 
 
Figure 1.Three Worlds of Human Experience 
 
Rudimentarily, we can associate Popper’s three worlds of human experience with our 
system of legal rights and penalties (Figure 2): 
 
Figure 2.Legal Protections and Sanctions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                
302  See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 205 (1890).  
303  See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (holding that marital privacy is a protected 
right under the Constitution).     
304  KARL R. POPPER, OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE: AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH 153 (1972).   
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Law operates on conscious subjectivity. We fear death and imprisonment, and appreciate 
life and liberty for more than what they do to our physical bodies. The philosopher Descartes 
described our perception of certain nonphysical entities such as morals, justice, virtues, and truth 
as consciously “real,” and evolutionary biologist Theodosius Dobzhansky named their “somber 
companions” as fear, anxiety, and death awareness.
305
 These produce the deterrent effect of legal 
sanctions vis-à-vis conscious subjectivity in World II. 
In Citizens United, the Supreme Court found McCain-Feingold unconstitutional by 
portraying organizations as simply another form that citizens could take to exercise their speech 
rights.
306
 In Hobby Lobby, similarly, the Court that, “protecting the free-exercise rights of 
corporations like Hobby Lobby . . . protects the religious liberty of the humans who own and 
control those companies.”
307
 By contrast to human beings, however, organizations have no inner 
life or associated subjective self-consciousness by which to exercise these rights. Organizations 
have only a material existence in World I;
308
 yet World II subjectivity acts both as a filter of 
experience that carries with it the possibility of empathy, and as the locus of fear that enhances the 
deterrent effect of legal sanctions in the world of human beings. 
This substantially explains why corporate crime is estimated to be far more common than 
any other kind of crime.
309
 It is a form of empathy failure stemming from organizations’ lack of 
subjectivity; or, more precisely, from their lack of what Otto Neurath called “intersubjectivity,” 
with human beings consequent to having an entirely different kind of existence.
310
 Thus, Professor 
Reich observed of corporate polluters during the early environmental rights movement that their 
combination of “vital factors of bureaucracy, organization, and technology” had produced “a 
powerful momentum of their own” that was simply “indifferent” to the interests held by entire 
classes of people.
311
 
In contrast, citizenship in the modern liberal state defines the formal relationship 
between human beings in political community with each other.  It is a combination of material 
aspects, such as rights of residence, and subjective ones, such as participation in deliberation over 
a common destiny by voting.
312
 We can in fact note this same distinction between subjective and 
                                                                
305  ECCLES & ROBINSON, supra note 279, at 121 (quoting Descartes), 25 (quoting Dobzhansky). 
306  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 372. 
307  Hobby Lobby, 134 S.Ct. at 2768.  
308
 Organizations are therefore fundamentally changed by alteration of their assets; a person, in contrast, 
experiences a continuity of self from birth until death despite undergoing significant material changes. See generally 
Kirsty L. Spalding, et al., Dynamics of Fat Cell Turnover in Humans, 453 NATURE 783 (2008); Olaf Bergmann, et al., 
Evidence for Cardiomyocyte Renewal in Humans 324 SCI. 98 (2009). 
309
 EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND & DONALD R. CRESSEY, CRIMINOLOGY 44-47 (1978). In law, the exemplary 
case is that of the Ford Pinto, which had a design defect that led the fuel tank to explode on rear end collisions.  Aware of 
the defect, Ford decided not to recall the cars based on a cost-benefit analysis that showed an $11 per vehicle repair 
necessary to correct the defect exceeded an estimated cost of $49.5 million to reimburse for death and injury; in 2014, 
General Motors was accused of similar reasoning concerning an ignition defect. See Mark Dowie, Pinto Madness, 
MOTHER JONES (1977), available at http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1977/09/pinto-madness; RICHARD A. POSNER, 
TORT LAW: CASES & ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 225-26 (1982).  
310
 Otto Neurath, Protocol Sentences, in LOGICAL POSITIVISM 199-208 (A. J. Ayer ed., 1959).  
311  CHARLES A. REICH, THE GREENING OF AMERICA 13-14 (Bantam 1971). 
312  Sociologist Gershon Shafir defines citizenship as “the transcendence of the instrumental sphere of 
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material ends in the definition of selfhood given by contemporary philosopher Michael J. Sandel: 
[The self] means there is always a distinction between the values I have and the 
person I am . . . . [T]he shape of this “me” must be given prior to any of the 
aims or attributes I bear.  One consequence of this distance is to put the self 
itself beyond the reach of its experience, to secure its identity once and for all.  
Or to put the point another way, it rules out the possibility of what we might call 
constitutive ends.
313
 
Organizations, by contrast, are explicitly constituted for ends without which they would 
not exist at all. Even an organization whose purpose is to serve human beings’ moral goals cannot 
“itself” possess the metaphysical attributes that would lead it to pursue the good for its own sake. 
It stands in instrumental relation to its ends, even if they are moral. This is the case with nonprofit 
organizations like Citizens United; and was precisely the point the Supreme Court made about 
corporate personhood in the nineteenth century.
314
 
Now that we have understood this key difference, we can return to McCain-Feingold. 
That law was an attempt to regulate the relationship between some of the most powerful 
organizations in our society and the mass broadcast and persuasive “electioneering 
communication” that their treasuries could purchase to influence the electorate. We can describe 
this as a regulation of the pass-through point between material wealth (World I) and persuasive 
forms of mass media (World III) as a means to influence individual voter subjectivity (World II):  
Figure 3. Pass-through Points 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                
necessity, in which we toil to satisfy our material wants, into the sphere of freedom where the practice of freedom, in a 
collective rational and moral deliberation over a common destiny, is its own reward.” Gershon Shafir, Introduction: The 
Evolving Tradition of Citizenship, in THE CITIZENSHIP DEBATES: A READER 1, 3 (Gershon Shafir ed., 1998).   
313  SANDEL, supra note 131, at 162. 
314  See Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. at 553, 637-38; see also KANT, supra note 62 and associated text. 
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Much critical thought was devoted during the twentieth century to the impact of mass media on 
individual consciousness. Observing social changes wrought by the rise of television, journalist 
George Trow described a “grid of two hundred million” and a “grid of intimacy” as the two poles 
of American experience in a televised culture in which the “middle distance had fallen away.”
315
 
Political scientist Robert Putnam empirically and precisely identified the depopulated space where 
local civic activity had starkly declined since the emergence of television.
316
 Sociologist David 
Riesman theorized a shift in individuals from “inner-directed” to “other-directed” personality 
coinciding with the rise of mass media,
317
 and psychologist Sherry Turkle found that while 
communications technologies lent unprecedented control and convenience in interpersonal 
relationships, they generated a feeling of being “alone together.”
318
 These effects have been 
detected even at the geopolitical level, where economist Jeffrey D. Sachs identified as a 
significant threat to growth and social order a “distracted society” in places of affluence and high-
tech communication like the United States.
319
 
Well before television, Antonio Gramsci noted that World I’s distinct ontological status 
meant that it could be captured or coopted by nonhuman actors, such as the state or other 
organizations, introducing the term “hegemony” to describe the power of cultural institutions like 
the media for purposes of social control.
320
 Walter Lippmann studied public opinion and famously 
coined the term “stereotype” to explain how people form opinions about what they do not 
know.
321
 What we “believe to be a true picture,” Lippmann said, “we treat as if it were the 
environment itself.”
322
 In an ever-more complex world, we rely heavily on what others say to craft 
our understandings of it. We become more susceptible to persuasive new forms of 
“iconography.”
323
 As Vaclav Havel noted when taking the helm of the world’s newest democracy 
                                                                
315  TROW, supra note 167, at 47.   
316  See PUTNAM, supra note 45, at 61-63. 
317  DAVID RIESMAN, THE LONELY CROWD: A STUDY OF THE CHANGING AMERICAN CHARACTER 13-21 
(1961); but see Talcott Parsons & Winston White, The Link Between Character and Society, in CULTURE AND SOCIAL 
CHARACTER: THE WORK OF DAVID RIESMAN REVIEWED 89-135 (Seymour Martin Lipset & Leo Lowenthal eds., 1961) 
(refuting Riesman and presenting an alternative explanation). 
318  See generally SHERRY TURKLE, ALONE TOGETHER: WHY WE EXPECT MORE FROM TECHNOLOGY & 
LESS FROM EACH OTHER (2011). 
319  JEFFREY D. SACHS, THE PRICE OF CIVILIZATION: REAWAKENING AMERICAN VIRTUE & PROSPERITY 
133-58 (2011). A half-century earlier, historian David M. Potter made a similar assertion that television aimed to “fix the 
attention but not the mind.” DAVID M. POTTER, PEOPLE OF PLENTY: ECONOMIC ABUNDANCE AND THE AMERICAN 
CHARACTER (1954). 
320  SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS OF ANTONIO GRAMSCI 245 (Quintin Hoare & Geoffrey 
Nowell Smith eds. and trans., 1971); see generally JACQUES ELLUL, PROPAGANDA: THE FORMATION OF MEN’S 
ATTITUDES (Konrad Kellen and Jean Lerner trans., 1965). 
321  WALTER LIPPMANN, PUBLIC OPINION 18-19 (First Free Press 1997). 
322  Id. at 4; see also IAN HACKING, REPRESENTING AND INTERVENING: INTRODUCTORY TOPICS IN THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF NATURAL SCIENCE 134 (1997). 
323  See, e.g., M.I.A.– Bad Girls (Official Behind the Scenes): Noisey Specials #08, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m6-sNTOhYnU&feature=youtu.be (last visited Jun. 13, 2015) (the creative directors 
of a pop music video use terms like “iconography” to explain how they convey specific ideas about gender roles, class, 
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in 1995: “how easily my television image can be made to seem different from the real me.”
324
 
These precise kinds of concerns generated public pressure on Congress to regulate the 
“ad wars” in American politics at the turn of the century by addressing its latest campaign finance 
reform expressly to mass broadcast forms of “electioneering communication.” To neutralize the 
concern, the Supreme Court articulated an optimistic view of an idea-marketplace made plentiful 
by new kinds of technology (and those organizations that could afford to use the marketplace to 
speak). Yet empirical work casts doubt on the validity of that portrayal.  In a recent paper tracking 
the flow of information into American households, W. Russell Neuman, Yong Jin Park, and Elliot 
Panek described the increase in the ratio of supply to demand for media minutes of information, 
from 82 in 1960 to 884:1 in 2005, as creating a greater than human-scale cognitive challenge.
325
 
Two generations earlier, philosopher and law professor Jacques Ellul mused that so much 
“excessive data do not enlighten the reader or the listener; they drown him . . . . [I]f he does not 
want to risk losing his mind, he will merely draw a general picture.”
326
 Supporting that assertion, 
one recent study found broadband access to be negatively correlated to national exam scores in 
middle schools.
327
 
The “antidistortion” interest that captured some of these concerns reappeared in 2011 in 
the case of W. Tradition P’ship v. Attorney Gen. of Mont.
328
 A Montana law prohibited 
corporations from making contributions or expenditures “in connection with a candidate or a 
political committee” unless from a separate, segregated fund solicited from shareholders, 
employees, or members of the corporation.
329
 Montana’s supreme court, however, focused not on 
capital but on technology, emphasizing that contemporary mass messaging had outstripped 
voters’ ability to parse it: “[f]or one thing, voters generally do not have the desire, much less the 
time, sophistication, or ability to sift through hours upon hours of attack ads . . . in order to 
winnow truth . . . from fiction and half-truths . . . .”
330
 This situation, the court found, marginalizes 
individual citizens’ impact on the political process because “it defies reality to suggest that 
millions of dollars in slick television and Internet ads—put out by entities whose purpose and 
expertise, in the first place, is to persuade people to buy what’s being sold—carry the same weight 
as the flyers of citizen candidates and the letters to the editor of John and Mary Public.”
331
 
                                                                
and social meaning). 
324  HAVEL, supra note 290. (“[t]elevision forces me to express my thoughts as sparely [sic] as possible, in 
witticisms, slogans, or sound bites . . . . [H]ow easily my television image can be made to seem different from the real 
me.”). 
325  W. Russell Neuman, Yong Jin Park & Elliot Panek, Tracking the Flow of Information into the Home: An 
Empirical Assessment of the Digital Revolution in the United States, 1960-2005, 6 INT’L J. COMM. 1022, 1034 (2012).  
326  ELLUL, supra note 321, at 87. 
327  See, e.g., Rodrigo Belo, Pedro Ferreira, & Rahul Telang, Broadband in School: Impact on Student 
Performance, 60:2 MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 265 (2014) (finding high levels of broadband access in Portuguese middle 
schools had a negative impact on national exam scores regardless of gender, subject, or school quality). 
328
 W. Tradition P’ship v. Attorney Gen. of Mont., 271 P.3d 22-23 (Mont. 2011), overruled by Am. 
Tradition P’ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012). 
329
 W. Tradition P’ship, 271 P.3d at 3.  
330
 Id. at 34.  
331
 Id. at 34-35.  
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Montana’s supreme court upheld the law. 
The Supreme Court overruled the decision based on Citizens United.
332
 Yet the variation 
in judges’ reasoning within these cases about technologies of mass media suggests that the 
Constitution preordains no specific theory of technology in relation to the exercise of expressive 
rights, and therefore judges must develop those theories alongside their jurisprudence in cases that 
require it.
333
 These theories are not constitutional theories, however; they are theories about the 
media and about communication. The “marketplace of ideas,” for example, reflects what media 
theorists call a “transmission view” of communication, which conceives of communication as a 
process whereby information is transmitted and distributed.
334
 This justifies Buckley’s focus on 
the quantity of ideas, irrespective of the money that is spent to produce them, by what kind of 
entity. The marketplace of ideas is simply the transmission of information; it matters little by 
whom or what means it is carried out. Citizens United relied heavily on the transmission view, 
quoting from Buckley: “A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on 
political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by 
restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the 
audience reached”
335
 harming “society as a whole, which is deprived of an uninhibited 
marketplace of ideas.”
336
 
A “ritual view” of communication looks at it as more than simply a way of getting ideas 
from one place to another. Rather, communication is a form of drama.
337
 “What is arrayed before 
the reader” of a newspaper, media theorist James Carey wrote in Communication as Culture, “is 
not pure information but a portrayal of the contending forces in the world.”
338
 This view explains 
Congress’ focus in McCain-Feingold on who and what is transmitting political communication 
before elections, and whether their relative power in society bears a risk of “distorting” electoral 
politics. This view is also at the heart of the Montana Supreme Court’s comment that “it defies 
reality to suggest that millions of dollars in slick television and Internet ads—put out by entities 
whose purpose and expertise, in the first place, is to persuade people to buy what’s being sold—
carry the same weight as the flyers of citizen candidates and the letters to the editor of John and 
Mary Public.”
339
 
The reason that the Supreme Court’s theory about mass media in relation to freedom of 
expression prevails over Congress’ (or, in this case, Montana’s supreme court) is because of its 
authoritative position as constitutional interpreter in a government of divided powers. 
                                                                
332  American Tradition P’ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012). 
333  See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (Harvard 
Univ. Press 1980) [introduction]. 
334
 JAMES W. CAREY, COMMUNICATION AS CULTURE: Essays on Media and Society 15 (Rev. ed. 1992).  
335  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 339 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19). 
336  Id. at 335 (quoting Hicks, 539 U.S. at 119).  
337  CAREY, supra note 334 at 15. 
338  Id. at 20. 
339
 W. Tradition P’ship, 271 P.3d at 34-35.  
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IV. CONCLUSION 
You are my creator, but I am your master; - obey!
340
 
This Article finds its place among studies of law and modernization, and has specifically 
sought to understand the relationship between law and technology in the transformation of the 
United States into an “organizational society” during the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
Working from the premise that law is an institution that reflects culture, it hypothesized that 
judicial opinions can serve as artifacts of particular moments in the history of modernization and 
social change.
341
 Noting that the United States became both highly technological and highly 
“organizational” during the industrial and postindustrial periods, this article located cases 
concerning the legal rights of corporations within the history of technology in order to identify 
what law and society scholars Susan Silbey and Caroll Seron describe as “the relationship of these 
legal practices to the macro transformations of modern society.”
342
 This interest is not unique, 
however, to sociologists who study law. Within the profession, one of the most cited legal 
scholars of the last century, Roscoe Pound, urged us to not only follow the law in the books, but 
also the “law in action.”
343
 
The Article therefore methodologically rejected the formalist claim that legal scholarship 
should confine itself to a “close reading” of the law’s own printed materials.
344
 That idea is useful 
because it allows the elaboration of systems of logically ordered and conceptually coherent 
doctrines on which lawyers can make predictions about the outcomes of legal arguments, yet it 
does little to associate legal change with what happens outside of legal institutions, making 
decisions like Citizens United—which involve a complex mix of reasoning about the law, 
technology, and society—extremely hard to explain. When a two hundred year-old legal concept 
like “corporate personhood” suddenly becomes controversial with no change in the underlying 
law, we should approach the jurisprudence that created the controversy as a “system of meaning,” 
not as a “machine.”
345
 To do that, this Article liberally crossed doctrinal categories and time 
periods and devoted very little space, for example, to mechanics of judicial review such as the 
intricacies of strict scrutiny. 
The Article began with a broad question: it asked how and why the United States 
Supreme Court’s view of corporations’ constitutional rights could diverge so widely from 
popularly held views and common sense notions of the same (roughly eighty percent of 
Americans opposed the ruling in Citizens United with relatively little difference of opinion among 
                                                                
340  MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT SHELLEY, FRANKENSTEIN: OR, THE MODERN PROMETHEUS 235 (1891).   
341  The Article approached judges’ writing from an “anthropological mode,” described by historian Robert 
Darnton as built upon the premise “that individual expression takes place within a general idiom, that we learn to classify 
sensations and make sense of things by thinking within a framework provided by our culture.”  ROBERT DARNTON, THE 
GREAT CAT MASSACRE AND OTHER EPISODES IN FRENCH CULTURAL HISTORY 6 (1985). Within this frame, judicial 
opinions can be viewed as artifacts “marked by the circumstances of their production.” SERGIO SISMONDO, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY STUDIES 11 (2010).  
342  Seron & Silbey, supra note 29, at 33. 
343  See generally Roscoe Pound, The Need of a Sociological Jurisprudence, 19 GREEN BAG 607 (1907).   
344  SERON & SIBLEY, supra note 29 at 33. 
345  Id. 
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Democrats (85%), Republicans (76%), and independents (81%)).
346
 It found that the answer 
cannot be told separately from a story about specific technologies that expanded organizations’ 
ability to do things in the later nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and the Court’s opinion of 
those technologies. Reading these strains of legal and technological history together, the Article 
revealed the provenance of Citizens United to be a line of cases that adapted legal paradigms to 
the rise of technologically-enabled organizations, first in jurisdiction, and then in speech. In these 
cases, the Supreme Court developed a particularly technologically-optimistic and -deterministic 
kind of constitutionalism as it reasoned about the role that corporations should play in our society 
as it continues to modernize. 
The Court maintained a kind of nineteenth-century affinity for individualism—but of a 
“shifted” kind. It construed corporations as political minorities that must be protected against 
majority tyranny, such as popularly enacted laws like McCain-Feingold and the Affordable Care 
Act, which regulate organizations specifically as organizations. Thus in Citizens United the Court 
said, referring to corporations and unions, “We find no basis for the proposition that, in the 
context of political speech, the Government may impose restrictions on certain disfavored 
speakers.”
347
 And in Hobby Lobby it said, “When rights, whether constitutional or statutory, are 
extended to corporations, the purpose is to protect the rights of these people” who own and 
control the corporation.
348
 
This Article has shown, however, that before the rise of an “organizational society” in 
the United States, a corporation was not seen as providing general protection for human beings in 
the sense of a complete set of rights that could be “shifted” from them. Well past the middle of the 
nineteenth century, the Supreme Court described corporate rights as limited other than “where 
contracts or rights of property are to be enforced.”
349
 As a means of deepening the antidistortion 
interest, this Article strongly critiqued the recent assertion that there is a straight and 
uncomplicated line from the full set of people’s rights to those of the organizations they create, 
because organizations fundamentally lack the kind of subjective consciousness that is possessed 
by the human members of the political community that brings them into existence. 
“Shifted personhood” is not the kind of methodological individualism that Professor 
Horwitz pointed out sustained the artificial entity theory of the corporation in which organizations 
are simply artificial aggregations of individuals: “artificial. . . . invisible, intangible, and existing 
only in contemplation of law,” in John Marshall’s formulation.
350
 It combines from 
                                                                
346  Dan Eggen, Poll: Large Majority Opposes Supreme Court’s Decision on Campaign Financing, WASH. 
POST, (Feb. 17, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/17/AR2010021701151.html; c.f., 
Supreme Court Favorability Reaches New Low, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (May 1, 2012), http://www.people-
press.org/2012/05/01/supreme-court-favorability-reaches-new-low (poll conducted Apr. 4-15, 2012). 
347  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 333. 
348  Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2769 (“the purpose of this fiction is to provide protection for human beings. . 
. . protecting the free-exercise rights of corporations like Hobby Lobby, Conestoga, and Mardel protects the religious 
liberty of the humans who own and control those companies.”). 
349  Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (1 Wall.) 168, 177 (Sup. Ct. 1868), overruled by United States v. Se. 
Underwriters Assn., 322 U.S. 533 (1944). 
350  See Horwitz, supra note 9, at 72 (“The artificial entity theory of the corporation . . . sought to retain the 
premises of what has been called “methodological individualism,” that is the view that the only real starting point for 
political or legal theory is the individual. Groups, in this view, were simply artificial aggregations of individuals. On the 
other hand, it was the goal of the Realists to show that groups, in fact, had an organic unity, that the group was greater than 
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methodological individualism the idea that the individual is the only real starting point for 
political or legal theory, and from the entity theory the idea that corporations have a kind of 
organic unity; they can participate in political discourse qua individuals, and even have “nerve 
centers” like living beings do.
351
 The result is a kind of Frankenstein creation that is made up of 
individuals but distinct and autonomous from them. This new “group theory” appears to have 
easily slid organizations and individuals into constitutional parity with each other during the 
twenty-first century. 
While people seem to widely oppose this idea of parity, we have struggled with how to 
debate about it. Citizens United came on the heels of the financial crisis of 2008, and the outcry 
over “corporate personhood” it provoked was focused on the interests of those who have capital 
versus those who do not.
352
 This directed analytic resources towards questions of class and away 
from questions of technology that were deeply central to the legislation the case overturned. This 
deeply obscured proper analysis of the case. There is little room to consider the particular role of 
technology within an argument that contends that Citizens United is part of a “campaign to 
increase corporations’ legal rights”
353
 or, conversely, that it articulates a reality so obvious and 
vital to American ways of being and doing as to be innocuous: “Corporations are people, my 
friend.”
354
 
While acknowledging that the association between legal order and class oppression has a 
legitimate history,
355
 this article went mostly around the conventional outlines of the corporate 
personhood debate in an attempt to illuminate what is less well understood than class and power 
differentials between individuals and corporations: the relationship between technology and the 
law. It argued that McCain-Feingold was an active attempt to regulate technology, rather than to 
simply allow it to “scale up” the electoral process to a series of “slickly produced television 
clashes” funded by corporations and unions.
356
 Citizens United and Buckley v. Valeo, in contrast, 
combined optimism about technologies of mass media as maximixing factors in the “marketplace 
of ideas” with deterministic reasoning about their effect on the constitutional protection of 
freedom of expression. These cases articulate that the law should lag behind technological 
change,
357
 allowing, in the formulation of STS scholars Leo Marx and Roe Smith, “technology to 
drive history.”
358
 
                                                                
the mere sum of its parts.”); Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. at 543. 
351  See Hertz, supra note 118, and associated text. 
352  The “Occupy Wall Street” movement viewed Citizens United as proof that the Supreme Court was 
willing to use its power to shore up the position of elite class allies. See, e.g., M.J. Lee, “Occupy Courts” to Hit Citizens 
United, POLITICO (Jan. 20, 2012), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0112/71711.html.   
353  Editorial, The Rights of Corporations, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2009, at A30. 
354  Mitt Romney, U.S. presidential candidate, Speech at the Iowa State Fair (Aug. 11, 2011) (responding to 
hecklers). 
355  See, e.g., William J. Chambliss, A Sociological Analysis of the Law of Vagrancy, 12 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 
67-77 (1964). 
356  See Zeleney, supra note 168. 
357  See generally Richard L. Abel, Law as Lag: Inertia as a Social Theory of Law, 80 MICH. L. REV. 785-
809 (1982).   
358  Marx & Smith, supra note 19.  
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We have perhaps failed to recognize judges’ reasoning about technology in these 
decisions because it becomes “blackboxed” within them and simply not seen as instrumental to 
the holdings.
359
 The Article argued that this phenomenon resulted in an analytic failure to 
distinguish Austin and McConnell as presenting two different kinds of antidistortion interests: the 
first concerning a regulation of capital (of contributions and expenditures) and the latter a 
regulation of technology (of “electioneering communication”). “Blackboxing” occurs because 
judges hew to traditional “rights talk” when they encounter technology management questions 
within the bounds of constitutional cases. This is understandable because judges, like scientists, 
are professionally constrained by rules of logical inquiry that do not allow them to transparently 
do normative work, such as concerning the management of technology in society.
360
 Yet “rights 
talk” places judges’ reasoning about the complex relationship between technology, organizations, 
and society within the bounds of a traditionally understood justification for the existence of 
countermajoritarian institutions like the federal courts. 
This has an implication in these types of technology cases. Justice Kennedy’s musings 
about television in Citizens United become part of “the law,” which is both a structure and a 
mechanism of social order. His optimism about a technologically-mediated “marketplace of 
ideas” prevails over Congress’ vision of a society in which the “ad wars” are tamped down by 
regulations, like McCain-Feingold. This does what Professor Cover described as “violence” 
towards the vision of society chosen against, and to those who hold that vision.
361
 When we fail to 
see judges’ reasoning about technology as part of their legal reasoning, we fail to hold them 
accountable for the harm done by their mandated technological orders—mandated because carried 
forth as a matter of constitutional interpretation whose effects cannot be reversed through 
ordinary legislation. Thus, this article sought to do two things: (1) raise questions of political 
theory concerning how judicial review fits into the fabric of majoritarian democracy in a 
technological age, and (2) sensitize judges to the hubris that allows them to let their norms 
supercede the legislature’s when they reason about the technologies that enable the exercise of 
particular freedoms. 
Pointing, in particular, to the Internet, the majority in Citizens United suggested that the 
antidote to mass media in politics was not more and better legislation, but more and better 
technology.
362
 However, there are reasons to doubt that the Internet can serve as a more 
democratic alternative to television. For instance, hundreds of thousands of Americans blog about 
politics, yet search engines concentrate online news audiences on the top corporate media 
outlets.
363
 Google is widely perceived as a tool for finding what simply “exists” online, but 
Google views its search results as a form of corporate speech protected under the First 
                                                                
359  This is another contribution from STS, which has described the “blackboxing” of normative choices 
within scores of technical objects. See, e.g., Trevor Pinch & Wiebe Bijker, The Social Construction of Facts and Artefacts: 
Or How the Sociology of Science and the Sociology of Technology Might Benefit Each Other, 14:3 SOCIAL STUDIES OF 
SCIENCE (1984).   
360  Michel Foucault, who studied the history of systems of thought, showed how historical anachronism 
functions similarly in the production of scientific knowledge despite its logical-rational frame. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE 
ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 135-95 (A.M. Sheridan Smith trans., Pantheon 1972).   
361  See Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986). 
362  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 364 (“Soon, however, it may be that Internet sources, such as blogs and 
social networking Web sites, will provide citizens with significant information about political candidates and issues.”).   
363
 See MATTHEW HINDMAN, THE MYTH OF DIGITAL DEMOCRACY 135 (2009). 
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Amendment,
364
 and modifies those results as it sees fit in a way computer scientist and professor 
of information Christian Sandvig describes as an “algorithmic allocation of attention.”
365
 Under a 
recent federal court ruling, the physical deliverers of online content—internet service providers, 
or “ISPs”—have no obligation to provide equal access or to deliver content at equal speeds.
366
 
ISPs already are substantially aligned with the corporate interests of cable television.
367
 Thus, 
twenty-first century communication technologies and the nodal, decentralized and flexible 
networks they make possible
368
 do not necessarily portend a shift of power outside of capital-rich 
organizations in our era. Technologies cost money to produce. Even if they are freely given to us, 
they continue to be expressions of the interests of capital.
369
 
However, nor do we here need to rely on a polarizing class critique, which views the 
mass media as part of an ideological superstructure driving a wedge of false consciousness into 
individuals.
370
 For at least two generations, sociologists have urged us to recognize that modern 
power lies not only with the “exploitative capitalist or an imperialist general or a narrow-minded 
bureaucrat,” but also in “the efficient structure of modern organizations.”
371
 We can therefore 
express concern about the Supreme Court ceding the First Amendment to the momentum of large-
scale sociotechnical systems of mass communication by underwriting its legal reasoning with 
“Pollyanna-ish” reasoning about technology and organizations, while avoiding becoming mired in 
                                                                
364
 See Eugene Volokh & Donald M. Falk, First Amendment Protection for Search Engine Search Results 
(Apr. 20, 2012), http://volokh.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/SearchEngineFirstAmendment.pdf (paper commissioned 
by Google). 
365  Christian Sandvig, Corrupt Personalization, SOCIAL MEDIA COLLECTIVE: RESEARCH BLOG (June 26, 
2014), available at http://socialmediacollective.org/2014/-6/26/corrupt-personalization/; See, e.g., Leslie Kaufman, Google 
Punishes Site in Ranking Scheme, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2013, at C2 (suppressing search results in retaliation against 
RapGenius); Claire Cain Miller & Mark Scott, Google Settles Its European Antitrust Case; Critics Remain, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 5, 2014, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/06/technology/google-reaches-tentative-antitrust-settlement-
with-european-union.html?_r=0  (alleging alteration of search results to promote business interests). 
366  See Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 658-59 (D.C. Cir. 2014). In the recent “net neutrality” decision, the 
D.C. Circuit found that that the FCC had relinquished its right to regulate Internet service providers (ISPs) as common 
carriers. Id. 
367  See Saul Hansell, Media Megadeal: The Overview; America Online Agrees to Buy Time Warner for 
$165 Million; Media Deal is Richest Merger, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2000, at A1. In 2000, internet company America 
Online and cable television company Time Warner merged to form the largest media company in the world, and in 2014 
cable and internet company Comcast moved to acquire the merged Time Warner Cable. Id.; David Gelles, Comcast Deal 
Seeks to Unite 2 Cable Giants, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2014) http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/02/12/comcast-set-to-
acquire-time-warner-cable/.  
368  See generally ALEA M. FAIRCHILD, TECHNOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF VIRTUAL ORGANIZATIONS (2003); 
Michael E. Porter, Clusters and the New Economics of Competition, HARV. BUS. REV. 77 (reprinted in 1998). 
369  Illustrating how technical things are inscribed with socio-economic relations is another central 
contribution of STS. See, e.g., Langdon Winner, Do Artifacts Have Politics? 109 DAEDALUS 121, 122, 126-27 (1980); Jim 
Johnson, Mixing Humans and Nonhumans: The Sociology of a Door-Closer, 35 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 298, 308-10 (1988). 
370  GRAMSCI, supra note 321, at 12. 
371  PETER M. BLAU & RICHARD A. SCHOENHERR, THE STRUCTURE OF ORGANIZATIONS 357 (1971). See 
also REICH, supra note 296, at 13 (observing corporate polluters during the early environmental rights movement that their 
combination of “vital factors of bureaucracy, organization, and technology” produced “a powerful momentum of their own 
that may not be inconsistent with class interests, but may well be indifferent to them.”). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol18/iss5/2
ROBINSON_SHIFTED PERSONHOOD_FORMATTED_FINALFINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/11/2016  10:03 AM 
2016] SHIFTED PERSONHOOD 455 
the gridlock of “class warfare” by accusing the Court of intentionally engaging in it. 
We must continue to unpack the debate over “corporate personhood” because 
technological orders established by constitutional decision-making will be significantly harder to 
alter than those by legislation, no matter how dystopian the results. Dystopian is how some 
describe deliberative democracy in its present form in the United States.  Relying on Citizens 
United, the D.C. Circuit in Speechnow.org inaugurated the era of the “Super PAC” by holding 
unanimously that organizations making independent expenditures that support or oppose 
candidates, cannot be restricted in receiving contributions of any size from any source.
372
 Super 
PACs qualify for tax-exempt status as social welfare groups under § 501(c)(4) of the Internal 
Revenue Code as long as they spend no more than fifty percent of their resources on explicitly 
political activities; they also need not disclose their donors.
373
 The fifty-percent rule has proven 
difficult to enforce, and money from obscure sources has flowed massively into political contests 
large and small across the country.
374
 
The use of Super PACs, like the use of television, has swept across party lines and 
ideological differences. After becoming the first presidential candidate to abandon public 
financing in 2008,
375
 Barack Obama became the first sitting president to utilize a Super PAC; his 
former campaign manager David Axelrod described the creation of these organizations as an 
“arms race” in which the Democratic Party could not afford to step down.
376
 In 2011, the FCC 
formally abandoned the Fairness Doctrine on grounds that new expansive media sources like 
cable television and the Internet had eliminated the broadcast scarcity on which the justification 
for “equal time” rested.
377
 In the last presidential election, some candidates simply used their 
campaigns “as promotional tours for books, movies, and their own personal brands.”
378
 
At the first stirrings of the Industrial Age, Mary Shelley told a tale about an inventor 
losing control of his creation. Often lost in the retelling is the fact that Dr. Frankenstein’s aim was 
not to create a monster, but a creature to do good. So too the growth of organizations in our 
                                                                
372  Speechnow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 696, 698 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  
373  See Chick & Henchey, supra note 4, at 6, 11.   
374  See, e.g., Jeremy Singer-Vine, How Much are Super PAC’s Spending? (2012), 
http://www.cairchicago.org/2012/08/06/super-pacs-changing-the-nature-of-the-game/; Matea Gold, Koch-Backed Political 
Network, Built to Shield Donors, Raised $400 Million in 2012 Elections, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 2014, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/koch-backed-political-network-built-to-shield-donors-raised-400-million-in-
2012-elections/2014/01/05/9e7cfd9a-719b-11e3-9389-09ef9944065e_story.html. 
375  See, e.g., 2008 Presidential Campaign Financial Activity Summarized: Receipts Nearly Double 2004 
Total, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, June 8, 2009, http://www.fec.gov/press/press2009/20090608PresStat.shtml. No 
presidential candidate since the initiation of public funding in 1971 had declined to use public funding. Id. After a high 
point of $240 million, the fund decreased to $139 million in 2008. Id. Barack Obama became the first ever major party 
nominee to refuse it, allowing him to raise a total of $745 million. Id. John McCain accepted $84.1 million in public funds 
after raising $46.4 million in private funds, and he was defeated. Id. 
376  Zeleney & Rutenberg, supra note 4.   
377  Press Release, FCC, FCC Chairman Genachowski Continues Regulator Reform to Ease Burden on 
Businesses; Announces Elimination of 83 Outdated Rules (Aug. 22, 2011), available at 
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-309224A1.pdf. Fairness Doctrine equivalents are still widely in effect 
as a form of electoral regulation throughout Europe.  
378  Zeleney, supra note 160. 
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society has been driven by our desire to find ways to live better and accomplish things in modern 
times. Their suitability in this regard is why Max Weber linked corporations’ emergence to the 
need for large-scale organization in modern industrial societies, and why he found them present 
irrespective of substantial differences in the surrounding form of political economy, such as 
whether it was democratic capitalism or socialism.
379
 
Oliver Wendell Holmes once described the theory of our Constitution as “an experiment, 
as all life is an experiment,” in which “we have to wager our salvation upon some prophecy based 
upon imperfect knowledge.”
380
 If our organizations become our monsters, it is because we have 
allowed it. Long before Citizens United and Hobby Lobby, Professor Tushnet put us on notice of a 
“well-worn path” by which corporations had “moved from the legislative arena, in which they had 
lost, to the judicial arena, where they succeeded in persuading the judges to rule that 
constitutional interests were at stake.”
381
 This is precisely what early corporate entity theory 
dissenter Justice Daniel predicted as the result of the Supreme Court’s decision in Letson. He 
described it as rendering a corporation “equal to a release from the thralldom of constitutional 
restriction, and made competent at any rate to the power of commanding the action of the federal 
courts.”
382
 Similarly, Dr. Frankenstein’s creature eventually said: “You are my creator, but I am 
your master; - obey! . . . Beware for I am fearless, and therefore powerful.”
383
 
Finally, this Article offers a brief word on further research. We have long had a deep-
seated cultural optimism about technology in the United States. A fruitful direction for further 
analysis will be to compare the evolution of the legal status of organizations in places with 
different perspectives on technological innovation, such as in Europe, where regulation of 
political communication is an area of significant regulatory contrast to the United States.
384
 My 
colleague Emanuel Bertrand, who is a member of the Science and Democracy Network, has noted 
a discursive trend of inclusion of organizations in political discourse as a proxy for individual 
civil society participation in the European Union.
385
 This is comparable to the rise of 
organizations in political discourse in the United States, and it would be interesting to see if there 
is a joint evolution in their constitutional status as speakers.
386
 Further, while this article has dealt 
                                                                
379  WEBER, supra note 28, at 337-38.   
380  Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
381  Tushnet, supra note 281, at 254. 
382  Marshall, 57 U.S. at 344 (1853) (Daniel, J., dissenting) (using the French word deterré, meaning 
literally “to unearth” to describe the corporation’s use of the judicial system). 
383  SHELLEY, supra note 341, at 235-36. 
384  Regarding technology, Europe as an example, experienced authoritarian uprisings during the twentieth 
century that harnessed technological innovation to negative effect, resulting in an overall more “precautionary” approach 
than in the United States. See, e.g., ROBERT PAARLBERG, THE POLITICS OF PRECAUTION: GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS 
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2001); SHEILA JASANOFF, DESIGNS ON NATURE: SCIENCE AND DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE AND 
THE UNITED STATES 280-87 (2005) (arguing that democratic decisionmaking has an important role to play in technology 
management and illustrating how that has been the case more in Europe than in the United States for, example, genetically 
modified food).   
385  See generally Emanuel Bertrand, The Participation of Organized Civil Society as Seen by the European 
Commission: The Discursive Regime of Participative Governance, Science and Democracy Network Tenth Annual 
Meeting (Paris, June 25-27, 2012) (on file with the author).   
386  See generally Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations 
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with organizational freedom of action under Article III and the First Amendment, its conclusions 
should be tested against analysis of disputes over organizational rights under the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments, and disputes over assigning to them higher-order responsibilities, such as 
humanitarian ones under the law of nations.
387
 An interesting other line of historical analysis 
would consider why radio, which was primarily regional, did not draw the same legislative or 
judicial attention concerning the political speech of organizations as did television. 
In 2010, the Wall Street Journal commended the Supreme Court for its decision in 
Citizens United, calling it the “branch of government that seems to understand technology 
best.”
388
 The simplicity of that conclusion—that the Supreme Court even has a point of view 
about technology—is reinforced by the fact that it has imposed an absolute, half-century ban on 
televising its own courtroom activities.
389
 This article has substantially fleshed out what the Court 
really thinks about technology, and how that point of view has underwritten its jurisprudence 
concerning certain kinds of corporate rights over two centuries. When he mused about the Internet 
in Citizens United, Justice Kennedy seemed to be looking for a new technology that could return 
the political conversation to individual citizens by restoring to them the power of speech, even as 
Citizens United opened it evermore to organizations.  The “new” technology needed is precisely 
the “old” one whose results the Court overturned: that, simply, of the democratic process. 
 
                                                                
or Between International Organizations, Mar. 21, 1986, available at 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_2_1986.pdf (expanding treaty-making to include 
organizations as parties). 
387  See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1663-64 (2013) (concerning whether 
corporations can be held accountable for human rights violations). 
388  L. Gordon Crovitz, Tech-Savvy Justices Protect Free Speech, WALL ST. J., May 10, 2010, 
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704858104575232340596598422 (“The branch of government that 
seems to understand technology best is the one whose members take notes on legal pads, not iPads.”). 
389  See, e.g., WASH. POST, Souter Won’t Allow Cameras in High Court, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1996, available 
at http://articles.latimes.com/1996-04-09/news/mn-56470_1_supreme-court (“The day you see a camera come into our 
courtroom it’s going to roll over my dead body”); Cheryl Hanna, Court Appearance, SEVEN DAYS, Nov. 29, 2006, 
available at http://www.sevendaysvt.com/vermont/court-appearance/Content?oid=2128871 (arguing that Supreme Court 
arguments should be televised. Ms. Hanna was well regarded and will be deeply missed at Vermont Law School). 
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